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REGULATION OF HATE SPEECH BY
EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS:
A PROPOSED POLICY
Jack M. Battaglia*
Paralleling an increase in hate motivated violence and
assaults in society at large,' incidents on college campuses
have become alarmingly frequent. Motivated by class based
animus, students have abused other students and faculty mem-
bers with words and symbols clearly intended to harass and
intimidate.2 As a result, a number of educational institutions,
public and private, either have adopted or are considering
policies which would prohibit words or symbols which injure
members of racial or religious minorities or other groups war-
ranting special protection.'
© 1991 by Jack M. Battaglia.
* Currently in private practice in Palo Alto, CA. B.A., 1968, Fordlham Col-
lege. J.D., 1971, Colunbia University. Former Associate Professor of Law, Touro
College School of Law, Ilumington, NY, and mniber of the firm Greenbauam,
Wolff & Ernst, New York, NY.
1. See generally Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the
Victim's Stoy, 87 Micli. L. REV. 2320, 2327-31 (1989). Anecdotal information is
often perceived by those who do not identify with target groups as describing ran-
dom and isolated incidensts. lHowever, "[Qor informed members of these victim
conimunities, . . . it is logical to link together several thousand real life stories
into one tale of caution." Id. at 2331. The difficulties of quantifying the extent of
hate violence will, hopefully, be ameliorated with the recent passage of the Federal
1-late Crime Statistics Act, Pub. L. No. 101-275, 104 Stat. 140 (1990). The new law
requires the Department of Justice to collect data on crimes motivated by race,
religion, national origin, or sexual orientation.
2. Matsuda, supra note 1, at 2333 n.71; Recent Cases -Racist and Sexist Expres-"
sion on Caopus - Conti Strikes Down University Limits on Hate Speech, 103 1HlARV. L.
REV. 1397, 1399-1400 (1990); Delgado, Words That Wound: A Toil Action for Racial
Insults, Epithets, and Name Calling 17 IIARI. C.R.-C.,. L. REV. 133, 135 n.12
(1982); Smolla, Rethinking Firt Amendment Assumptions About 'Racist and Sexist
Speech, 47 WAStI. & IEE 1L. REV. 171, 176-78 (1990) ("These slurs rape the soul.").
Recent racist activity on campus has been characterized as a "backlash" against af-
firmative action and attem)ts to diversify the curricula with ethnic-based cotrses.
White Students' Backlash Mounting at Unive3ities, San Francisco Examiner, May 28,
1990, at A8, col. 3.
3. Recent Cases, supra note 2, at 1397 n.l. By statute, two states provide a
civil remedy for infitidation or harassment motivated by specified class-based
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To the extent that a hate speech4 policy is considered a
content based restriction on expression,5 it will raise serious
first amendment questions. With varying approaches, several
commentators have argued that various forms of hate speech
may be prohibited consistent with the first amendment.6
This article searches pertinent first amendment authority
for principles which would support a hate speech policy at
educational institutions, and proposes the text of a policy
which is believed to reflect those principles. Although there is
much appeal to Professor Matsuda's position that "[w]e can
attack racist speech - not because it isn't really speech, not
because it falls within a hoped-for exception, but because it is
wrong,"7 a more limited approach exists which will effectively
accommodate all the values having an impact on the issue.
Part I of this article reviews the most relevant first amend-
ment doctrine, as revealed in cases involving (A) "fighting
words" and the incitement to the lawless action, (B) group
defamation, and (C) the imposition of tort liability for individ-
ual injury. Section (D) addresses cases involving hate speech,
animus. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-135 (1985); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-42.1 (West 1984 &
Supp. 1988).
4. For purposes of discussion only, the tern "hate speech" is used to de-
scribe verbal or lehavioral cxprcssion which reflects class blased animls by reason
of race, ethnicity, national origin, gender, religion, handicap, sexual orientation, or
other class characteristics which have no relationship to individual valie.
5. "Because racial insuls differ fiont ordinary, non-actiottable insults precisely
because they use racial ternis for the purpose of deliieaniing the victim, a tort for
racial instills will almost certainly be seen as a regulation of content and thus be
subject to the more exacting scruliny afforded in such cases." Delgado, supra note
2, at 172-73. See infra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
6. See supra notes 1-2. See also Jones, Article 4 of the International Conve,,tion
on the Elimination of All Fons of Racial Discrimination and the Fist Amendment, 23
HoW. L.J. 429 (1980); Arkes, Civility and the Restriction of Speech: Rediscovering the
Defamation of Groups, 1974 SuP. CT. REV. 281; Att, Freedom From Fern; 15 LINCOLN
L. REV. 45 (1984); Note, Group Vilification Reconsidered, 89 YALE 1..J. 308 (1979);
Greenawalt, Insults and Epithets: Are They Protected Speech?, 42 RUTGERS I.. REV. 287
(1990). Compare with Heins, Banning Words: A Comment on "Words That Vound', 18
HARV. C.R.-C.I. L.. REV. 585 (1983). For an account of the Canadian experience
inther a law making it a criminal offense willfully to promote hatred against
people distinguislhed by race, religion or ethnic origin, see A. Borovoy, K.
Mahoney, B. Brown, J. Canterott & D. Goldberger, Colloquium, Language as Vio-
lence v. Freedom of Expression: Canadian and American Perspectives on Group Defama-
tion, 37 BUFFALO L.. REV. 337 (1989).
7. Matsuda, supra note 1, at 2380. Professor Matsuda argues for an "explicit
content-based rejection of narrowly defined racist speech." Matsuda, supra note 1,
at 2360.
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and those cases which apply general first amendment doctrine
in the particular setting of educational institutions are dis-
cussed in section (E).
Part II identifies the elements of a hate speech policy
which will be able to withstand first amendment scrutiny, in-
cluding (A) the harmful or undesirable effects which the policy
might seek to prevent, (B) the causal relationship between the
proscribed speech and those effects, and (C) necessary first
amendment safeguards. Four hate speech policies which have
been adopted or proposed are analyzed in the context of these
elements.
Part III proposes a hate speech policy which more precise-
ly reflects competing interests. This author proposes that hate
speech, which has the purpose and likely effect of intimidating
students from full participation in educational processes, can
be proscribed consistent with the first amendment, and, in-
deed, should be proscribed in educational settings.
I. FIRST AMENDMENT PRINCIIES
Public educational institutions are constrained by the first
amendment in enforcing policies which affect speech. The
formulation of first amendment standards applicable in the
educational context may differ from those which govern more
public speech, and may vary by level of institution.' Neverthe-
less, the first amendment antipathy to content based inhibi-
tions on speech remains the primary operative value.
Private educational institutions have a choice. On the one
hand, they may attempt to devise policies which would with-
stand judicial scrutiny if adopted by a similar public institution,
in other words, policies which give primacy to the first
amendment. On the other hand, they may be guided by the
values of the particular institution, in the relative positions of
importance ascribed to them by the institution. As applied to
the relationship between the institution and its members, this
process may or may not strongly resemble the first
amendment's mediation between the government and its citi-
zenry.
The first amendment constructs no absolute bar to gov-
ernmental regulation of speech. Expression in all forms, wheth-
8. See infra notes 84-107 and accompanying text.
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er perceived aurally or visually, is subject to reasonable and
non-discriminatory time, place, and manner restrictions.9 In
such situations, and others in which the regulation is not
aimed at the communicative impact of the speech, the govern-
mental interest furthered by the regulation is balanced against
the first amendment interest. However, when regulation is
aimed at communicative impact, it will be sustained only if it
falls within certain categories of unprotected speech, or is oth-
erwise justified by a compelling state interest.'
A. "Fighting Words"/Incitement
In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire," the Supreme. Court
held that a state could crimninalize "insulting or 'fighting'
words-those which by their very utterance inflict injury or
tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace."'
2 Although
the Court's delineation of the type of speech subject to pro-
scription ' has two parts and is stated in the disjunctive-words
"which by their very utterance inflict injury" or words which
"tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace"-subsequent
decisions have focused on the actual likelihood of such a
breach of the peace, and have virtually ignored that portion of
the formulation which looks to whether the speech, without
more, directly causes injury.' However, the Court has never
expressly repudiated the direct injury portion of the "fighting
words" formulation."
9. l-effron v. international Soc'y for Krishmna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640,
647 (1981).
10. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL. LAw 580-82, 602 (1978); Ely, Flag
Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Catego ization and Balancing in Fihst Amend-
ment Analysis, 88 IIARV. .. REV. 1482, 1501 (1975); Smolla, Emotional Distress and
the Fipst Amendment: An Analysis of Hustler v. Fahelg 20 ARIZ. ST. l.J. 423, 441,
460-61 (1988).
11. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
12. Id. at 572.
13. See e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971) ("fightiig words" are
"those personally abusive epithets which, when addressed to Ihc ordinary citizen,
are, as a matter of colmituon knowledge, inherenlly likely to provoke violent reac-
tion"); Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2542 (1989) ("fighting words" are those
"likely to provoke tile average person to retaliation, and thereby cause a breach of
tie peace").
14. Justice Powell considered the direct injury portion to have significant
force. Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901 (1972) (per curiam) (Powell, J., dis-
senting). After reviewing the post.Chaplinsky cases, one conimiemetator concluded
that tile direct injmury portion of time formulation still has limited application when
[Vol. 31
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The breach-of-the-peace portion of the Chaplinsky formula-
tion is consistent with more generally applicable first amend-
ment principles. In effect, it incorporated the previously articu-
lated "clear and present danger" test. 5 That test, which was
developed in cases involving advocacy of the use of force or of
a violation of law, in its modern formulation looks to whether
the speech is "directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action. '"16
The incitement formulation articulates a state-of-mind require-
ment, as well as an assessment of the probability that the
speech will produce lawless action.' 7 The Chaplinsky "fighting
words" formulation does not by its terms refer to the speaker's
state of mind. Rather, once the requisite effect is established,
the speaker's state of mind may be presumed."
B. Group Defamation
The "fighting words"/incitement doctrines provide a clear
but limited basis for prohibiting hate speech. A broader basis
might be found in Beauharnais v. People of the State of Illinois,
which upheld a criminal statute prohibiting any publication or
exhibition which "portrays depravity, criminality, unchastity, or
lack of virtue of a class of citizens, of any race, color, creed or
religion to contempt, derision or obloquy or which is produc-
tive of breach of the peace or riots . . Previously, in
the utterance constitules a "direct personal insult." Rabinowitz, Nazis in Skokie:
7ighting words" or Heckler's Veto, 28 DE PAUL L. REV. 250, 274 (1979). Another,
however, concludes that the subsequent opinions "cast serious doubt on whether
words may be p unished as offensive unless they create a substantial risk of re-
sponsive violence." R.K. CREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME AND TIlE USES OF LNNGUAGE
at 210 (1989).
15. See Terininiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1919); Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
16. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
17. State of mind was also related to the existence of a clear and present
danger. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52 ("If the act, [speaking, or circulating a paper,] its
tendency and the intent with which it is done are the same, we perceive no
ground for saying that success alone warrants making it a crime.").
18. Professor Greenawalt suggests that the "fighting words" doctrine did not
under traditional law require intent, but only a likelihood of promoting a violent
response; and argues that "it should be sutfficient for punishment that the defen-
dat know the propensity of the words lie uses, even if at the .tine of speaking
he was in such a rage lie did not consider their likely effect." R.K. CREENAWALT,
supra note 14, at 282-83.
19. 343 U.S. 250, 251 (1952).
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Chaplinsky, the Court had listed "the libelous" among those
"classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which
has never been thought to raise any constitutional prob-
lem."2 The Court in Beauharnais then reasoned that "if an
utterance directed at an individual may be the object of crimi-
nal sanctions, we cannot deny to a State power to punish the
same utterance directed at a defined group, unless we can say
that this is a willful and purposeless restriction unrelated to the
peace and well-being of the State."2 After recognizing a histo-
ry of racial and religious disorder in Illinois, and the "claims of
social scientists as to the dependence of the individual on the
position of his racial or religious group in the community, 
"22
the Court found that the statute withstood scrutiny under the
stated standard.
There is a serious question as to whether Beauharnais in
its broadest thrust remains good law. 2  The articulated stan-
dard ("purposeless restriction unrelated to the peace and
well-being of the state") is certainly more deferential to the leg-
islative judgment than contemporary first amendment stan-
20. 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942). ihe "lewd and obscene" were also listed.
For argunents analogizing racist speech to obscenity, see Delgado, supra note 2, at
177-78, and Lasso.,, Racial Defamation As Free Speech: Abusing the First Amendment,
17 COLUM. HuM. RTS. L. REV. 11, 47 (1985). It has been suggesled that "fighting
words", incitement and obscenity are speech that "bypasses the conscious faculties
of its hearers," and, therefore, "causes harm in such a way that it cannot be
counteracted by opposing speech." Note, supra note 6, at 318. So too might hate
speech. 1 lowever, this rationale for proscribing hate speech imtst he limited by lhe
recognition that the first amendment protects the emotive as well as the cognitive
force of speech. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971).
21. 343 U.S. at 258. Professor Smolla characterizes Beauharnais as an example
of "generic clear and present danger," that is, "it is within the legitimate prove-
nance of the state legislature to make generic determinations concerning individual
harm and communal danger." Smolla, supra note 2, at 193-95.
22. Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 263. Professor Kretzmner, Hebrew University of Je-
rusalemn, argues that racist speech is unique among the types of speech which may
be offensive or dangeons hecamise of the "catastrophic historical experience with
racism," and tlie "universal formal condemnation of racism." Kretzmuer, Freedom of
Speech and Racism, 8 CARI)OZO I.. REV. 445, 458 (1987). For a discussion of the
role of social science in establishing the likelihood of harm for first anendtment
purposes, see Krattenmaker & Powe, Televised Violence: Fi.t Amendnent Ptinciples
and Social Science Theoiy, 64 VA. i.. REV. 1123, 1191-96, 1292-96 (1978).
23. But see Smith v. Collin, 439 U.S. 016, 919 (1978) (Bllackmnin & White, J.J.,
dissenting from tdenial of certiorari). The commentators also disagree. See, e.g.,
Note, A Cominunitarian Defense of Group Libel Laws, 101 IARV. L. REV. 682, 694-96
(1988) (still good law); Lasson, supra note 20, at 32-37 (still good law); Cf. Smnolla,
supra note 10, at 443-44 ("Beauhamnais . n .must be regarded as a dead case.").
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dards. Similarly, to the extent that Beauharnais rests upon a
relationship between racial and religious propaganda and the
history of disorder in Illinois, it may have required less of a
degree of causal probability than is demanded by more recent
case law.24 Furthermore, whereas Beauharnais sustained the
refusal of the Illinois courts to entertain truth as a defense,2 5
the Supreme Court's more recent first amendment decisions
mandate that the individual libel plaintiff prove falsity "against
a media defendant for speech of public concern. "26
C. Individual Injury
Perhaps most importantly, the major premise of Beau-
harnais-that there is no first amendment bar to state proscrip-
tion of libelous statements as to an individual-has been sub-
stantially undermined. Beginning in 1964, the Supreme Court
has ruled that first amendment considerations require that
public officials and those "properly classified as public fig-
ures . . .may recover for injury to reputation only on clear and
convincing proof that the defamatory falsehood was made with
knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for the
truth."
2 7
In the case of "defamatory falsehood injurious to a private
individual," the balance between first amendment values and
the state's legitimate interest in providing compensation for
injury to reputation strikes at a different point than in the case
of public persons, and "so long as they do not impose liability
without fault, the states may define for themselves the appro-
priate standard of liability. '28 Once fault is established, the
individual private plaintiff may recover for actual injury, which
can include "impairment of reputation and standing in the
community, personal humiliation, and mental anguish and
suffering."29 If the individual private plaintiff can meet the
24. See Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1204 (7th Cir. 1978), cell. denied, 439
U.S. 916 (1978).
25. 343 U.S. at 265-66. The question of trial in a group libel case is, at best,
"complicated". Reisman, Democracy and Defamation: Control of Group Libe4 42
COLU.NI. L. REV. 727, 777 (1942).
26. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Ilepps, 475 U.S. 767, 777 (1986).
27. Gertz v. Robert Welch. Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974).
28. Id. at 346-47.
29. Id. at 350. Indeed, in Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976), the
Supreme Court upheld recovery by a private plaintiff when the only injury for
1991]
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knowing-or-reckless-falsity standard of liability applied to public
persons, there may be recovery of presumed damages, without
proof of actual injury. Punitive damages may be recovered as
well. ° Moreover, when the defamatory speech addresses a
matter of purely private concern, the private plaintiff may
recover presumed damages and punitive damages even without
a showing of knowing or reckless falsity:3'
The Supreme Court has held that false statements of fact,
on which the defamation cause of action is based, have "no
constitutional value." 2 Like "fighting words," they "are no es-
sential part of any exposition of ideas" and have "slight social
value as a step to truth.33 However, "[t]he First Amendment
requires that we protect some falsehood in order to protect
speech that matters. 3 4 When a false and defamatory state-
ment is made about an individual, the fault standards imposed
in part by reference to the public or private status of the indi-
vidual provide the necessary accommodation between first
amendment freedom and the states' interest in compensating
for injury.
Where does this leave Beauharnais? At common law, a
defamatory statement made about a group or class could prop-
erly be the basis of an action by an individual member of the
group or class, only if the group were sufficiently small, or if
there were other circumstances so as to allow the conclusion
that the particular plaintiff was defamed. 5 Therefore, the
which tile plaintiff sought compensation was tile emotional distress induiced by the
defamation.
30. Geulz, 418 U.S. at 349-50.
31. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greernoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761
(1984). Whether or not specech addresses a matter of public concern will be de-
termined by its "content, form, and context." Id. at 761 (citing Connick v. Meyers,
461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983)).
32. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340.
33. Id. (quotinig Chaplinshy, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).
34. Id. at 341. The notion that "[tlhe danger of govertnuent suppressing true
ideas is greater than the harm that will be caused by allowing free expression of
defined, almost certainly false, ideas" is no more nor less than "a postulate, or anl
article of faith." Kretzmer, supra note 22, at 474. Moreover, "[t]here are some
views, the chance of whose being true is so small, even granted human fallibility,
that the risk of suppressing truth cannot be serious reason for disallowing their
suppression." Kretziner, supra note 22, at 471.
35. See, e.g., Neiman-Marcus v. l.ait, 13 F.R.D. 311 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); Note,
Group Defamation: Five Guiding Facton, 64 TEX. L. REV. 591 (1985); Behon, The
Control of Group Defamation: A Comparative Study of Law and Its Limitations, 34 TUL.
[Vol. 31
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state interest validated in Gertz was based upon at least a pre-
sumption of individual harm. Beauharnais was based in part on
deference to a legislative judgment "that a man's job and his
educational opportunities and the dignity accorded him may
depend as much on the reputation of the racial and religious
group to which he willy-nilly belongs, as on his own merits."3 6
Aside from defamation and the related area of false light
privacy, 7 the Supreme Court has only infrequently consid-
ered the limitations which the first amendment imposes on
tort recovery for individual injury. In a case bordering on the
defamation/false light area, Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell,3
the Court held that "public figures and public officials may not
recover for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress by reason of publications such as the one [t~here at issue
without showing in addition that the publication contains a
false statement of fact which was made with 'actual malice,' i.e.,
with knowledge that the statement was false or with reckless
disregard as to whether or not it was true."3 9 In the case of
L. REV. 469, 474-80 (1960). The cases recognize an exception when the defamato-
ry statement, "though made in group terms, is really a veiled reference to a
specific group member." Comment, Group Defamation and Individual Actions: A New
Look at an 01 Rule, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1532, 1535-36 (1983). For an argument
that "tile psychological model behind tile conmon-law limits on group libel actions
is inapposite when vilifying speech is directed at a target group against which the
hearer is already prejudiced," see Note, supra note 6, at 309-14. In addition to the
question of harm, recognition of the rights of the group involves difficult issues
of principle. Kretzmer, supra note 22, at 467.
36. 343 U.S. at 263. It has been suggested that, assuming group libel remains
constitutionally viable, Gemiz would require a showing of knowing or reckless
falsity: first, because "group libel of at least some types may be deemed more like
public-figure than like private-individual libel"; and, second, because such a show-
ing "is a necessary predicate to all punitive recovery or to any recovery in the
absence of a showing of 'actual damages.'" N. DORSEN, P. BENDER & B.
NEWBAINE, EMERSON, HABER & DORSEN'S POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE
UNITED STATES 658 (1976). See also Reisman, supra note 25, at 777 ("[A]hnost
nothing that groups do is 'private, in tile sense of being wholly outside the con-
ceivable bounds of communal concerns.") At least seven states have statutes which
cover group libel: CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-37 (1991); ILl. ANN. STAT. Ch. 38 §
27-1 (1961); MAss. GEN. L. ch. 272, § 98(c) (1990); MINN. STAT. § 609.765 (1987);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-212 (1989); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200-510 (1986); W. VA.
CODE § 61-10-16 (1989). Of these, only tile Massachusetts, Illinois and Montana
provisions require a showing of intent.
37. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967); Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing
Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974).
38. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
39. Id. at 56.
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the purported parody to which Falwell objected, he was re-
quired to show that the magazine made a "reasonably believ-
able" statement of fact.4"
The practical effect of the Court's ruling clearly is to pre-
vent the public plaintiff from circumventing the first amend-
ment defamation rules by suing instead for intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress. However, it did so by injecting into
the legal elements of emotional distress a falsity requirement
which was not present before and which, at least as a general
proposition, does not fit the theory of the tort."
1 As the
Court saw it, when applied to suits by public officials and pub-
lic figures,4 2 the common law elements of the tort, including
intent and outrageousness, are in themselves insufficient to
accommodate first amendment interests."
3
The Falwell case illustrates the difficult distinctions be-
tween fact and opinion, or fact and idea, for first amendment
purposes. In the more recent case of Milkovich v. Lorain Jour-
nal Co.,44 the Court reversed a state court's recognition of a
constitutionally required opinion exception to the application
of its defamation laws. The Court found that first amendment
interests are "adequately served by existing constitutional doc-
trine without the creation of an artificial dichotomy between
'opinion' and fact."'15 Existing doctrine "ensures that a state-
ment of opinion relating to matters of public concern which
does not contain a provably false factual connotation will re-
ceive full constitutional protection,'
46 and provides "protec-
tion for statements that cannot 'reasonably [be] interpreted as
40. Id. at 57.
41. Ilie Falwell approach to accommodating first amendment interests 
and
those furtihered by tile emotional distress tort has been criticized. 
Anderson,
Tortious Speech, 47 WA\s. & LEE L. REV. 71, 81-82 (1990). But it has also been
defended. See Sniolla, supra note 10, at 448-52.
42. This qIalification is highlighted by tie Co,,rt's qIoitation 
from Dun &
Bradstreet that "not all speech is of equal First Amendment importance." 
Dili] &
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Gcreennioss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758 (1984).
43. Fahvell 485 U.S. at 55-56 ('"Outrageousness, in the area of political and
social discourse has an inherent subjectiveness about it which would allow a jury
to impose liability on the basis of the jurors' tastes or views, or perhaps on the
basis of their dislike of a particular expression." Id. at 55.)
44. 110 S. Ct. 2695 (1990).
'45. Id. at 2706.
46. hM.
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stating actual facts' about an individual."47 The relevant inqui-
ry, therefore, is "whether or not a reasonable factfinder could
conclude that the statements ... imply an assertion" of fact
about an individual,4" which, in turn, would seem to depend
upon whether the statements are "sufficiently factual to be
susceptible of being proved true or false."4
The Court has also considered a few cases in which civil
recovery was sought for an invasion of privacy based upon the
publication of concededly factual and true statements. The
Court has held that, under the facts presented, because the
information was lawfully obtained, liability could not be consti-
tutionally imposed for its publication.5" Clearly engaging in
ad hoc balancing, the Court refused to hold that "truthful pub-
lication may never be punished consistent with the First
Amendment,"'" and suggested "the possibility that, in a prop-
er case, imposing civil sanctions for publication" of true infor-
mation might be "overwhelmingly necessary" to satisfy the
state's interests. 52
However, the Court raised the first amendment barrier to
liability in Florida Star because, among other reasons, the
state's rules "require[d] no case-by-case findings that the disclo-
sure of a fact about a person's private life was one that a rea-
sonable person would find highly offensive,"53 "[n]or is there
a scienter requirement of any kind ... engendering the per-
verse result that truthful publications challenged pursuant to
this cause of action are less protected by the First Amendment
than even the least protected defamatory falsehoods."54
47. I(. (quoting Fahvell, 185 U.S. at 50).
48. 1(. at 2707.
49. Id.
50. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 109 S. Ct. 2603 (1989).
51. Id. at 2608-09.
52. Id. at 2611.
53. Id. at 2612. Previously the Court had ruled in the criminal context that
an individualized determination was required in order to sustain a prohibition on
the disclosure of information regarding judicial misconduct proceedings. Landmark
Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 812-44 (1978). However, the type
of information involved in that case "lies near the core of the First Amendment."
Id. at 838.
54. Flofida Stat; 109 S. Ct. at 2612. The Coirt had determined the news
article which was the subject of the action (if not the particular fact disclosed)
concerned a "matter of public significance." Id. at 2611. Therefore, the Gemtz fault
standard provided an appropriate comparison.
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A number of cases have arisen in which state and lower
Federal courts have been asked to impose civil liability on the
media for personal injury alleged to have resulted from print-
ed or broadcast speech. In some cases, the injured party imitat-
ed conduct which was described or portrayed on television or
in a magazine,55 thus resulting in harm to the victim from his
own conduct in reaction to the speech.56 In others, third par-
ties imitated the harm-producing conduct,57 the media alleg-
edly creating or contributing to the risk of harm to the vic-
tim.58
Contrary to the thrust of Gert, the courts usually analyze
these cases under the incitement test of Brandenburg v. Ohio,
supra, and rule that the plaintiff has failed to establish that the
speech is unprotected by the first amendment." Even when it
is recognized that Brandenburg is of limited applicability in the
context of a private civil suit for tort damages, the standard of
care imposed precludes liability in all but the most unusual cases.
60
55. Wait Disney Productions, Inc. v. Shannon, 247 Ga. 402, 276 S.E.2d 580,
on remand 158 Ga. App. 508, 281 S.E.2d 648 (1981) (child attempted to reproduce
sound effect demonstrated on children's TV program by rotating BB inside an
inflated balloon); DeFilippo v. National Broadcasting Co., 446 A.2d 1036 (1982)
(boy apparently hanged himself while imitating hanging stunt observed on TV);
Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1987) (adolescent's
death allegedly caused by magazine article which described practice of autoerotic
asphyxia).
56. McCollunm v. CBS, Inc., 202 Cal. App. 3d 989, 249 Cal. Rptr. 187 (1988)
(boy shot and killed himself while lying oil his bed listenling to recorded music, as
result of alleged "uncontrollable inpulse" created by tmnu1sic).
57. Olivia N. v. National Broadcasting Co., 74 Cal. App. 3d 383, 141 Cal.
Rptr. 511 (1977) (girl artificially raped with a bottle by nninors who had allegedly
seen an artificial rape scene on TV drama).
58. Zamora v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 480 F. Stipp. 199 (S.D. Fla. 1979)
(boy became so desensitized by TV violence that he leveloped a sociopathic
personality and killed neighbor); Weirum v. RKO Gen'l, Inc., 15 Cal. 3d 40, 539
P.2d 36, 123 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1975) (victim's auto forced off the road by young
motorist listening to and engaged in radio station contest to locate disc jockey
driving about and giving away money); Eituann v. Soldier of Forttne Magazine,
Inc., 680 F. Supp. 863 (S.D. Tex. 1988), revd, 880 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1989) (muaga-
zinc ranm personal services advertisement ihroigh which husbald of deceased
contracted to have deceased murdered).
59. See generally Olivia N., 74 Cal. App. 3d at 388-89, 141 Cal., Rptr. at 514;
Herceg, 814 F.2d at 1023. That liability was imposed in Wieon, 15 Cal. 3d at 40,
523 P.2d at 36, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 468, has been explained on the ground that the
case involved "a specie of incitement to imminent lawless conduct for which no
First Amendment protection is justified." McCollum, 202 Cal. App. 3d at 1005, 249
Cal. Rptr. at 196.
60. Shannon, 247 Ga. at 420, 276 S.E.2d at 583. In Eimann, 680 F. Stpp. at
356
REGULATION OF HATE SPEECH
In none of the personal injury cases which have applied
the incitement test has the court adequately explained why the
approach in Gertz is less appropriate. Indeed, they rarely recog-
nize that an issue arises." Although the results in these cases
can be distinguished from the usual hate speech context in
that "[t]here was no dynamic interaction with or live importun-
ing of, particular listeners,"62 that fact appears to be ad-
dressed to the question of whether or not the incitement test
had been satisfied, rather than the appropriateness of applying
this test.
D. Hate Speech Cases
In Collin v. Smith,6" the Seventh Circuit found unconstitu-
tional an ordinance which prohibited "[t]he dissemination of
any materials ... which promotes and incites hatred against
persons by reason of their race, national origin, or religion,
and is intended to do so." The village which adopted the ordi-
nance did not rely on any fear of responsive violence to justify
the ordinance. As a result, the ordinance could not be sus-
tained under the "fighting words"/incitement doctrines. Nor
could it be sustained under Beauharnais, given the court's limit-
ed reading of its rationale.6"
The village in Collin, which had a large Jewish population,
proposed to apply the ordinance to Nazi marches which in-
volved Nazi uniforms and swastikas. The village sought to sus-
683, the District Court permitted recovery on the basis of negligence. Oin appeal,
the Fifth Circuit reversed on the negligence issue, noting the "limited first anmend-
ment protection for commercial speech" (Inirg its risk-mility analysis. See also
Meyerson, This Gun for Hire: Dancing in the Dark of the Fiist Amendment, 47 WASI.
& LEE L. REV. 267 (1990).
61. A notable exception is Judge Jones' concurring anl dissenting opinion in
Herceg 814 F.2d at 1025-1030, in which she rejects the Brandenburg approach in
favor of balancing. Both the "incitement model" and the "balancing model" have
been found wanting when applied in the tort context. Anderson, supra note 41, at
73-75, 90-97. See also Note, Toil Liability of the Media for Audience Acts of Violence:
A Constitutional Analysis, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 529 (1979); Note, Toi Liability for
Nonlibelous Negligent Statements: First Amendment Considerations, 93 YALE L.J. 744
(1984).
62. McCollum, 202 Cal. App. 3d at 1005, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 197.
63. 578 F. d 1197, 1204 (7th Cir. 1978) cell. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978).
64. Id. at 1202-05. For anl argument that Collin was correctly decided, see
Downs, Skokie Revisited: Hate Group Speech and the First Amendment, 60 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 629, 661-66 (1985).
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tain the ordinance on the basis of its interest in preventing
"the infliction of psychic trauma on resident holocaust survi-
vors and other Jewish residents."65 The court noted that Illi-
nois recognized the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress; but even "[a]ssuming that specific individuals could
proceed in tort under this theory to recover damages probably
occasioned by the proposed march, and that a First Amend-
ment defense would not bar the action, it is nonetheless quite
a different matter to criminalize protected First Amendment
conduct in anticipation of such results."66
The court noted, however, that "[t]here is room under the
First Amendment for the government to protect targeted lis-
teners from offensive speech, but only when the speaker in-
trudes on the privacy of the home, or a captive audience can-
not practically avoid exposure."67 The court also noted that it
was not considering a law prohibiting the "menacing by uni-
formed bullies of a survivor of the holocaust, or anyone else,
on the street."6 Nor was it reviewing a law which prohibited
"action designed to impede the equal exercise of guaranteed
rights, ... or even a conspiracy to harass or intimidate others
and subject them thus to racial or religious hatred."69
In contrast to Collin v. Smith is Vietnamese Fishermen's Asso-
ciation v. Knights of the K.K.K.,"0 in which the private
Vietnamese Fishermen's Association and the State of Texas
sought, and obtained, injunctive relief against, among other
things, military training programs conducted by the K.K.K. In
an earlier opinion, the court had concluded that "provocative
statements by defendants constituted intimidation and had a
substantial possibility of inciting others to engage in, acts of
violence and intimidation directed at the Vietnamese fisher-
65. Collin, 578 F.2d at 1205.
66. Id. at 1205-06. See Note, First Amendment Limits on '"oly Liability for Words
Intended to Inflict Severe Emotional Distress, 85 COUI.. I.. RFV. 1749 (1985), arguing
that extreme and outrageous language can be tile object of tort liability only when
its use constitutes .. fighting words"" or invades an area of recognized spacial
privacy of tile plaintiff.
67. Collin, 578 F.2d at 1206.
68. Id. at 120 n.8.
69. Id. at 1204 n.13. Recently, a city's denial of a ptarade permit to the
K.K.K. was declared violative of the first atnenditent by a Federal District Judge.
Town Rulem Can't Rein in Klan Parade, San Francisco )aily Journal, July 5, 1990,
at 7, col. 1.
70. 543 F. Stipp. 198 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
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men," so as to warrant the characterization "fighting
words.""' In this opinion, the court found that "the threat of
violence which defendants communicated through their mil-
itary activities is precisely such an irrefutable and dangerous
'communication' that it resembles the use of 'fighting
words' ..."72 The court issued a broad injunction which pro-
hibited "intimidation of the plaintiff class," "the burning of
crosses on property within the geographic area where mem-
bers of the plaintiffs' class live," "gatherings of two or more
robed members of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan within the
personal view of members of the class," and "any other activi-
ties which have as their purpose or reasonably foreseeable
effect the use or threatened use of military or paramilitary
force to infringe upon the civil rights of the plaintiff class."73
In Doe v. University of Michigan,"1 the court considered
the constitutionality of a university policy on hate speech. Gen-
erally, the policy prohibited individuals, under penalty of sanc-
tions, from "stigmatizing or victimizing" individuals or groups
on the basis of, among other characteristics, race, religion,
ethnicity, gender or sexual orientation.75 The plaintiff was a
psychology graduate student, concerned that discussion of
certain controversial theories positing biologically-based differ-
ences between sexes and races might be sanctionable under
the policy.76 The court found that the drafters of the policy
intended that speech need only be offensive to be
sanctionable, 77 and that students in the classroom and re-
search setting who "offended others by discussing ideas
deemed controversial could be and were subject to disci-
pline."78 Moreover, the "innocent intent of the speaker was
71. Id. at 208.
72. 1I.
73. Id. at 219-20.
74. 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
75. Id. at 853, 856.
76. Id. at 858.
77. Id. at 860.
78. Id. at 861. "We are aware that desecration of the flag is deeply offensive
to many. But the same might be said, for example, of viruleat ethnic and reli-
gious epithets . . . 'If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amend-
ment, it is that the Government may not prohibit tie expression of an idea
simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.'" U.S. v.
Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404, 2410 (1990) (quoting fiom Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct.
2533, 2544 (1989)).
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apparently immaterial to whether a complaint would be pur-
sued."79
As interpreted and applied by the university, the policy
was found to be invalid for both overbreadth and vagueness,
on the latter ground because the university "never articulated
any principled way to distinguish sanctionable from protected
speech."8" However, the court made clear the limited scope
of its ruling. First, consistent with "the privacy of the home,
where the individual's right to be left alone clearly outweighs
the First Amendment rights of an intruder,"8' the court not-
ed that the constitutionality of the policy as it related to verbal
conduct and verbal behavior in university housing was not
raised in the complaint. 2 More generally, the court noted
that the policy was not limited to threats for purposes of intim-
idation, the use of harassment to create a "hostile or offensive
working environment," or libel and slander "including possibly
group libel," for "[i]f the Policy had the effect of only regulat-
ing in these areas, it is unlikely that any constitutional problem
would have arisen."8 3
1. Educational Institutions
Although the court in Doe recognized that general first
amendment principles "acquire a special significance in the
university setting, where the free and unfettered interplay of
competing views is essential to the institution's educational
mission," 84 there is no separate treatment of the Supreme.
79. Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 866 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
80. Id. at 867.
81. F.C.C. v. Pacifica Found'n, 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978).
82. Doe, 721 F. Stipp. at 856 n.6.
83. Id. at 862-63. Professor Greenawalt identifies 21 different ways in which
state law, as reflected in the Model Penal Code, critninalizes speech. Greenawalt,
supra note 14, at 6-7. Federal protection against workplace discrimination extends
to the creation of a "hostile environment" based npon racial or sexual harassment,
even when speech creates the environment. Meritor Say. IBank v. Vinson, 477 U.S.
57, 63-67 (1986). In Mepitor, the "Court may have iniplicitly carved out an area of
first amnendent law . . . in which equality interests ca, ontweigh fi-ce expression
interests." Recent Cases, supra note 2, at 1401 n.43. See generally Denis, Race
Harassment Discriminalion, A Problem That Won,t Go Away', 10 EMPLOYEE REL. L. J.
415, 422-24 (1981). See infra note 173.
84. Doe, 721 F. Stipp. at 863. On the other hand, university campuses have
been characterized as "governmen(ally created fornums," and "[tihere is first amend-
ment authorily fir the proposition that where government creates a forum for
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Court's decisions in the educational context. In Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School Distric85 which involved
symbolic speech in a public high school, the Court authorized
restriction of student speech when "necessary to avoid material
and substantial interference with school work or discipline...
or the rights of others." 6 The first part of the formulation is
akin to the breach of the peace standard in the criminal con-
text. The second recognizes the institution's interest in protect-
ing its students from injurious speech, an interest also recog-
nized in both civil and criminal law.
In Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeir,87 the Court held
that the Tinker formulation would not be applied to
"educators' authority over ... expressive activities that stu-
dents, parents and members of the public might reasonably
perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school."88 Such activi-
ties include school sponsored publications and any other "part
of the school curriculum, whether or not they occur in a tradi-
tional classroom setting."89 Control over speech in such con-
texts is permitted whenever "reasonably related to legitimate
pedagogical concerns. " ' °
The Hazelwood Court relied heavily on an earlier ruling in
Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser,9 which permitted a stu-
dent to be disciplined for having delivered a speech that was
"vulgar," "lewd" and "plainly offensive" at an "official school
assembly."92 Quoting from Fraser, the Court held that a
school must be free to "disassociate itself" from speech which
is "wholly inconsistent with the 'fundamental values' of public
school education,"" or which advocates conduct "inconsistent
private.speech the government enjoys a broader power to regnlate tlhe content of
the speech then it would otherwise possess." Smolla, spra note 2, at 202-03
(citing F.C.C., 438 U.S. at 748).
85. 393 U.S: 503 (1969).
86. Id. at 511.
87. 484 U.S. 260 (1988). llazelhood is criticized in lIcnes and Connally, Whel,
Students Speak: Judicial Review in the Academic Marketplace, 7 Y.i.F. L. & POL'y REV.
343, 370-77 (1989).
88. Id. at 271.
89. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271.
90. Id. at 273.
91. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
92. Hazehiood, 484 U.S. at 271 n.4.
93. Id. at 266-67.
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with 'the shared values of a civilized social order."'' 4 Specifi-
cally, a school may "disassociate itself" from speech that is "bi-
ased or prejudiced." 5
Having held that the Tinker formulation did not apply to
the school sponsored speech involved in the case before it, the
Hazelwood Court found it unnecessary to decide whether the
lower appellate court was correct in limiting the rights-of-oth-
ers portion of the formulation to situations where the subject
speech could result in tort liability to the school. 6 The Court
also noted that it was not deciding "whether the same degree
of deference [to educators' decisions] is appropriate with re-
spect to school-sponsored expressive activities at the college
and university level." 7 In the first amendment establishment
clause context, the Court has discerned a difference in the
susceptibility of students at different educational levels to an
implication of government endorsement.
98
Several lower federal courts have considered whether sec-
ondary school officials may prohibit speech which African
American students have found offensive. At least against a
backdrop of past racial disorder and continuing racial tensions,
courts have found that Tinker allows the prohibition in the
interest of preventing future disruption." ' However, where
the interest to be furthered by the prohibition on racially of-
fensive speech is not the prevention of disruption, but a reduc-
tion in discrimination allegedly practiced against African Amer-
94. Id. at 272.
95. Id. at 271. Public schools "inculcai[e] fimdamental valies necessary to the
maintenance of a democralic political system." Anibach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68,
77 (1979).
96. llazehood, 484 U.S. at 273 1.5.
97. Id. at 273-74 n.7. However, citing Tinket; the Court has stated: "A
university's mission is education, and decisions of this Court have never denied a
university's authority to impose reasonable regiflations compatible with that mission
upon the use of its campus and facilities." Widinar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263,
267-68 n.5 (1981). Compare Martin v. Parrish, 805 F.2d 583, 585-86 (5th Cir. 1986)
with Di Bona v. Matthews, 220 Cal. App. 3d 1329, 269 Cal. Rptr. 882 (1990).
98. Compore Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 385 (1985) with
Widma?; 454 U.S. 263, 274 11.14 (1081).
99. Melton v. Young, 465 F.2d 1332, 1335 (6th Cir. 1972); Tate v. Board of
Educ. of Jonesboro; Ark., 453 F.2d 975, 982 (8th Cir. 1972) (dictum); Augustus v.
School ld. of Escanibia Conty, Fa., 507 F.2d 152, 156, 158 (5th Cir. 1975) (dic-
tumi). See also Cuzick v. Drebus, 431 F.2d 594, 597 (1h Cir. 1970) (prohibition
against all buttonis upield, when buttons with racial messages had caused disrulp-
tion).
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ican students, a demonstration of a greater causal nexus may
be required.' °
In Trachtman v. Anker,1'° the Second Circuit held that
secondary school officials could prohibit distribution of a sex
questionnaire, which the officials believed would cause emo-
tional harm to some students. Although the court spoke vari-
ously of "reasonable cause to believe,""02 "substantial basis"
and "rational basis,"' 03 the thrust of the opinion was the
court's deference to the judgment of the officials "to protect
the students committed to their care ... from peer contacts
and pressures which may result in emotional disturbance to
some of those students."
0 4
Indeed, particularly at the college and university level, the
institution's self-governance is itself of first amendment signifi-
cance."5 Specifically, a first amendment interest arises in "se-
lect[ing] those students who will contribute the most to the
'robust exchange of ideas.""00 A diverse student body serves
that interest, which is considered to be compelling. 7
II. EiEMENTS OF HATE SPEECH POLICY
A hate speech policy which adequately reflects first
amendment values will have a number of discernible yet relat-
ed elements. The policy would be directed to preventing ef-
fects which an institution may legitimately find harmful or
undesirable. Such effects may include the prevention of vio-
100. Banks v. Muncie Community Schools, 433 F.2d 292, 298 (7th Cir. 1970).
See also Joyner v. Whiting, 477 F.2d 456 (4th Cir. 1973) (university's withdrawal of
financial support from official student newspaper which had a segregationist edi-
torial policy, in absence of any student or faculty menl)er complaint that the edi-
torial policy incited harassment or interference, violated first amendment).
101. 563 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1977).
102. Id. at 517.
103. Id. at 519.
104. Id. This deference included the judgment that students in the eleventh
and twelfth grades, as well as younger students, might suffer harm. It has been
suggested that a school system may have a duty to protect students friom the
psychological harm of hate speech. Gyory, The Constitutional Rights of Public School
Pupils, 450 FORDHAM L. REV. 201, 219 (1971).
105. Byrne, Academic Freedom: A Special Concern of the First Amendment, 99 YALE
L.J. 251, 312-20, 331-39 (1989).
106. University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 31:3 (1978) (Powell J. for
the Court).
107. Id. at 31415.
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lence, either as a reaction on the part of the targeted individu-
al, or by third parties against the individual; the prevention of
other conduct recognized to be unlawful by society at large or
considered by an institution to be undesirable, such as discrim-
ination against members of targeted groups or intimidation of
students from full participation in the educational process;
and/or the prevention of nonphysical injury, such as
reputational injury or emotional distress.10 8
The policy would also reflect circumstances that will en-
sure a sufficiently strong causal relationship between the pro-
scribed speech and the undesirable effect(s). Such circumstanc-
es may include reference to the location where the speech
occurs, in order to provide greater protection to the "captive
audience;" a requirement that the speech be face to face or
directed at an individual or small group; and/or more of an
objective standard in determining the likelihood that the unde-
sirable effect(s) will occur.
The policy would also contain safeguards to minimize the
proscription of communicative content of speech and to avoid
conferring broad discretion on the factfinder in an individual
case. These may include a fault or state-of-mind requirement as
to the speaker, perhaps one which is more of a subjective stan-
dard, and/or a clear description of the type of speech which,
in the first instance, would be deemed to involve a likelihood
that the undesirable effect(s) will occur.
Finally, the policy would establish a range of sanctions
which would give primacy to educational rather than punitive
considerations.
The precise elements of the policy will depend upon cer-
tain foundational conclusions concerning the relevance to hate
speech of the various facets of first amendment doctrine. Is
the regulation of hate speech directed to the communicative
108. There may also he strong symbolic significance to the restriction of hate
speech. Kretzer, snpra note 22, at 456; Note, A Communitarian Defense of Group
Libel Laws, 101 IIARV. .. REV. 682 (1988). However, goverinnental interests of a
symbolic nature do not appear to have great force it irst atnendtnent jurispru-
dence. U.S. v. Eichtnan, 110 S. Ct. 2401; see supra note 78 and accompanying text.
Moreover, as an interest, it provides little guidance in devising an appropriate hate
speech policy. For these reasons, the important messages which are conveyed by
tile adoption of a hate speech policy, although confirming society's coimitment to
the other values and interests which have l)een idenlified, are not separately
addressed in the balance of this discission.
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impact of speech, so that a more rigorous first amendment
proving regimen is necessary? Must falsity be an element of the
offense, or will other elements sufficiently safeguard first
amendment interests? Is the "generic clear and present dan-
ger" approach evidenced in Beauharnais constitutionally valid,
or must the policy require a demonstration of individual
harm?
Hate speech almost always has some communicative val-
ue,10 9 and, therefore, is entitled to some level of first amend-
ment protection. However, as the expressive content becomes
more emotive and less cognitive,110 or when the purpose is
to hurt and humiliate rather than to communicate facts or val-
ues,111 the importance of the speech for first amendment
purposes is substantially diminished. Moreover, when the con-
tent of speech is regulated because it interferes with some
legitimate interest other than whatever emotional disturbance
it may cause, as in the law of defamation or sexual harassment
in the workplace, the less rigorous balancing approach is ap-
propriate."12
Students subjected to hate speech will almost always be
private figures. Therefore, neither Falwell in the area of emo-
tional distress,113  nor the Court's invasion of privacy
cases, 114 necessarily require a showing of falsity.' 15 Howev-
er, if hate speech is considered to address a matter of public
concern, the Court may well find that falsity, or some surro-
gate, is necessary to accommodate first amendment interests.
Moreover, the defamation law concept of presumed damages
cannot be applied to speech involving matters of public con-
109. Greenawalt, supra note 14, at 143-45; Note, supra note 66, at 1775-77.
110. Smolla, supra note 2, at 185-86.
111. Greenawalt, supra note 14, at 145, 297.
112. Tribe, supra note 10, at 641; Smolla, supra note 10, at 441, 460-61,
471-73. Assuming the hate speech addresses a matter of public concern, and is
directed to a private figure, Professor Smolla's "multi-tiered solution" would allow
recovery for emotional distress when there is some fault "with regard to the risk
of the non-emotional distress component of the injury." Id. at 466-67 (emphasis in
original).
113. See supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
115. "Trials about truth could easily do much more damage than the original
communications," and adopting a law limited to false assertions of fact "would be
senseless." Greenawalt, supra note 6, at 306. See also Kretzmer, supra note 22, at
496.
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cern, without a showing of falsity and "actual malice."
1 16
The Court has yet to give significant content to the private
concern/public concern distinction; however, it appears to be
primarily a subject matter test. 17 Although the nature and
extent of dissemination are relevant, they are not determina-
tive."' The fact that certain views are expressed privately
does not, in and of itself, establish that these views do not
address a matter of public concern.
19
Given the limited communicative value of hate speech,
even if it is deemed to address a matter of public concern, its
contribution to the marketplace of ideas is minimal. 120 More-
over, to the extent that hate speech is proscribed for reasons
other than the resulting emotional distress per se-namely, its
discriminatory and intimidating consequences-the balance of
interests tilts decisively away from the speaker. Although surro-
gates will be desirable to safeguard first amendment interests,
falsity should not be required, except peihaps for group li-
bel.
121
Similarly, as in the case of presumed damages, an individ-
ual demonstration that actual harm resulted from the hate
speech should not be necessary. So long as the primary harm
which is presumed is in the nature of individual, rather than
societal, injury, 22 and a high degree of fault is, in fact, demon-
116. See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
117. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 786-87
(1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 773 (White, J., concurring). Justice White's concurrence was neces-
sary to the majority.
119. Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School, 439 U.S. 410 (1979). However,
when the views are expressed privately, there may be greater latitude for control
as legitimate time, place and manner restrictions. Id. at 415 n.4.
120. When speech addresses a matter of public concern "in only a most
limited sense," its prohibition might be justified on thIe basis of a "reasonable
belief" that it would disrupt governmental operations. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S.
138, 154 (1983). Perhaps more significantly, all of the Supreme Court's'pronounce-
ments concerning individual injury and the first amendment concern speech about
rather than to the individual, a distinction of importance in light of the public
debate rationale of the defamation cases. Le Bel, Emotional Distress, The Fit
Amendment, and "This Kind of Speech": A Heretical Perspective on Hustler Magazine v.
Falwel4 60 U. COLO. L. REV. 315, 322-23 (1989).
121. "[T]he appropriate analysis readjusts the first amendment matrix govern-
ing defamation to reflect the different balance of social interests posed by emo-
tional distress cases." Smolla, supra note 10, at 468. See also Note, supra note 66,
at 1783, and supra note 36.
122. Thus distinguishing Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S.
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strated,12 1 the legislative determination should be sustained.
Furthermore, unlike recovery for defamation or invasion of
privacy, which is usually not justifiable by any interest other
than compensation to the individual, the enduring effects of
hate speech contribute to the weight on the prohibition side of
the balance.' 24 These longer-term societal effects themselves
may be serious enough to justify restriction, without an individ-
ualized showing of harm in each case.
125
All of these issues of first amendment impact, and particu-
larly the question of individualized harm, must be illuminated
by the interests of the educational process. It is quite clear that
an educational institution, or at least a secondary school, may
restrict speech by some students in order to protect the valid
interests of other students, and there is no indication that the
institution must await proof of actual harm.' 26 As a general
proposition, a student's susceptibility to harm, particularly
emotional harm, may arguably be less by the time the student
has reached the college or university level. Also, the relation-
ship between the student and the institution may be different,
as the institution may have less of a parens patriae role. In the
case of hate speech, however, many college level students will
not have had previous exposure that may build resistance. And
parens patriae aside, the institution should retain responsibility
for maintaining the integrity of the educational process.
A. Harmful or Undesirable Effects
1. Violence
A hate speech policy which proscribes speech which is
likely to produce immediate retaliation by a targeted individual
is clearly consistent with the first amendment. Similarly, speech
Which is likely to incite imminent physical attack on one or
more members of a targeted group may be prohibited. Al-
though speech likely to result in such breach of the peace cer-
829, 842-44 (1978). See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
123. Thus distinguishing Florida Star v. B.J.F., 109 S. Ct. 2603 (1989).
124. See infra notes 129 and 133 and accompanying text.
125. Greenawalt, supra note 14, at 301.
126. See supra notes 84-104 and accompanying text. For an argument that the
suppression of hate speech would be justified in light of the special first anend-
ment interests of children, see Garvey, Children and the Fitst Amendment, 57 TEX.
L. REV. 321, 333-51, 361-64 (1979).
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tainly may be covered, a policy so limited would probably be
redundant in light of existing institutional rules. In any event,
such a policy fails to come to terms with those pernicious ef-
fects particular to hate speech.
The "fighting words" concept itself reflects a system de-
signed to serve white males and any policy limited by its
breach of the peace principle would be similarly deficient."2 7
As with an incitement doctrine which focuses on the immi-
nence of violent action, the "fighting words" concept ignores
the relationship over time between hate speech and violence, a
relationship recognized by the Court in Beauharnais.28
Speech that carries a message of class based inferiority directly
legitimizes subordination and violence. Indeed, stigmatization
invites violence, for the stigmatization of the victim as a practi-
cal matter often precludes punishment of the perpetrator.'29
Hate crime legislation, including the Federal Hate Crime Sta-
tistics Act signed into law on April 23, 1990,"'° evidences the
growing awareness that violence motivated by class based ani-
mus is different.
2. Discrimination
Beyond violence, a policy may be directed against class
based discrimination. When the speech itself is the mechanism
of discriminatory treatment, there is no doubt that it may be
proscribed.' More broadly, however, the relationship be-
127. Criticism of the "fighting words" standard is widespread. See, e.g.,
Matsuda, supra note 1, at 2355-56; Greenawalt, supra note 14, at 295-98 ("[lit is
not unlikely that they hurt those victims who feel defenseless and unable to fight
more than those who actually fight back.").
128. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. The historical record demon-
strates that "escalating racist speech always accompanies racist violence." Matsuda,
supra note 1, at 2352 n.166. "[W]hile general studies showing the connection
between racist speech and tise spread of racial discrimination or racist violence are
almost impossible to execute, there is no lack of individual cases in which tile
connection between speech and violence has been quite clear." Kretzmer, supra
note 22, at 465.
129. Harry, Derivative Deviance: The Cases of Extomiion, FagBashing and Shakedown
of Gay Men, 19 CRIMINOLOGY 546 (1982) ("Derivative deviance is here defined as
that subset of all victimizations which is perpetrated upon other presumed devi-
ants who, because of their deviant status, are presumed unable to avail themselves
of civil protection.").
130. Hate Crime Statistics Act, Pub. L. No. 101-275, 104 Stat. 140 (1990). The
new law requires the Department of Justice to collect data on crimes motivated by
race, religion, national origin, or sexual orientation.
131. Pittsburg Press Co. v. Pittsburg Coumm'n on luman Relations, 413 U.S.
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tween speech and discrimination is similar to that between
speech and violence. It may intimidate a targeted individual
from full participation in the educational process, including
extra-curricular activities. And it may incite others to deprive
members of the targeted class of the benefits and privileges
otherwise available through the institution. Particularly when
the message of inferiority is delivered under circumstances
which would suggest agreement by the institution, hate speech
effectively denies the opportunity to learn.3 2 Here again, the
Beauharnais Court understood the relationship over time be-
tween speech and discriminatory treatment.' 3
Federal law provides a remedy for any conspiracy "for the
purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person
or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of
equal privileges and immunities under the laws."3 4 It is clear
that this provision reaches purely private conspiracies, that is,
those that do not in any' way involve the state.' 5 It is not
clear, however, whether the law is limited to conspiracies mo-
tivated by racial bias. 6 Lower federal courts have denied its
protection to homosexuals' and to women seeking abor-
tions, 3 8 because these classes have not been designated by
376 (1973); Long v. Valentino, 216 Cal. App. 3d 1287, 265 Cal. Rptr. 96 (1989).
132. See supra notes 87-95 and accompanying text. Professor Smolla identifies
the speech principles of the fourteenth amendment, and argues that the preven-
tion of stigma, lying at the heart of equal protection analysis, qualifies as a com-
pelling state interest. Smolla, supra note 2, at 198-202.
133. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. See also Kretzmer, supra note
22, at 462-65. These "long-term harms flow largely from the message the speaker
wants to convey. Trying to prevent the harms is regulating speech because of its
dangerous content." Greenawalt, supra note 14, at 148. Professor Lawrence goes
further, and argues that Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954),
mandates the abolition of racist speech. Lawrence, If le lollet, Let Him Go:
Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 438-49. His view has been
directly challenged. See Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest
Pmposat4 1990 DUKE L.J. 484, 541-49.
134. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). See also 18 U.S.C. § 245 which makes it a crime for
a person acting alone "by force or threat of force" to wilfully intimidate another
person because of race, color, religion or national origin and because the person
is attending a public college.
135. Griffen v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
136. United Bd. of Carpenters & Joiners v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 835 (1983).
See generally Gormley, Pivate Conspiracies and the Constitution: A Modem Veision of
42 U.S.C. Section 1985(3, 64 TEX. L. REV. 527 (1985).
137. DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 333 (9th Cir. 1979).
138. National Abortion Fed'n v. Operation Rescue, 721 F. Supp. 1168, 1171
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the courts as suspect or quasi-suspect for purposes of equal
protection analysis. Moreover, Congress has not indicated
through legislation that they are in need of special protection.
As to homosexuals, recent passage of the Federal Hate Crimes
Statistics Act may today lead the courts to a different conclu-
sion.
In applying the first amendment, can a compelling interest
be recognized in the protection of a group against discrimina-
tion or intimidation when that group has no special status for
equal protection analysis? In Bowers v. Hardwick,"9 the Court
upheld Georgia's criminalization of homosexual sodomy
against a challenge based upon the "right to privacy" found in
the due process clause. After determining that there is no
"fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy," 4 ° the
Court held that the "presumed belief of a majority of the elec-
torate in Georgia that homosexual sodomy is immoral and
unacceptable" provides a sufficiently "rational basis" to sustain
the law.'
The Court in Bowers did not consider the constitutionality
of the statute under the equal protection clause. 42 However,
a number of federal appellate courts have since concluded that
homosexuality is not a suspect or quasi-suspect class for pur-
poses of equal protection analysis. 4 ' A statutory classifica-
tion which is suspect (based on race, national origin or alien-
(C.D. Cal. 1989). But see New York Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 886 F.2d
1339, 1358-59 (2d Cir. 1989), ceis. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2206 (1990).
139. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
140. Id. at 190-91.
141. Id. at 196.
142. Id. at 196 n.8. For an equal protection clause analysis of same-sex sodomy
statutes, see Developments, Sexual Orientation and the Law, 102 -IARV. L. REV. 1508,
1525-31 (1989).
143. High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563,
571 (9th Cir. 1990); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464 (7th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 1296 (1990); Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076
(Fed. Cir. 1989), ceil. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1295 (1990); Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d
97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987); but see, Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699,
724-28 (9th Cir. 1989) (Norris, J., concurring); Gay Rights Coalition v. Georgetown
Univ., 536 A.2d 1, 36-37 (D.C. 1987) (dictum). See also Developments, supra note
142, at 1564-71; Note, The Constitutional Status of Sexual Oientation: Homosexuality
As a Suspect Classification, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1285 (1985); Sunstein, Sexual Orienta-
tion and the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship Between Due Process and Equal
Protection, 55 U. CI. L. REV. 1161 (1988); Note, Homosexuals and Heightened
Scrutiny After Boweis v. Hardwick, 31 B.C.L. REV. 375, 455-74 (1990).
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age) will be subjected to "strict scrutiny" under the equal pro-
tection clause, and sustained only when it is narrowly tailored
to achieve a compelling state interest. A classification which is
quasi-suspect (based on gender or illegitimacy) will be subject
to "intermediate scrutiny," and sustained when it is sub-
stantially related to an important state goal.'
Whether or not homosexuals are entitled to special pro-
tection under the equal protection clause, a governmental
interest in preventing discrimination or intimidation on the
basis of sexual orientation should be recognized as compelling
for purposes of the first amendment. In Gay Rights Coalition v.
Georgetown University,' the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals held that the District's compelling interest in the erad-
ication of sexual orientation discrimination required
Georgetown, despite its religious objections, to obey a man-
date, found in the District of Columbia Human Rights Act,
that the University provide to a gay student organization the
same tangible benefits provided to other student groups.'46
The court summarized the compelling interest that a state has
in eradicating sexual orientation discrimination as including
"the fostering of individual dignity, the creation of a climate
and environment in which each individual can utilize his or
her potential to contribute to and benefit from society, and
equal protection of the life, liberty and property that the
Founding Fathers guaranteed to us all."'1 7 The court found
that "[d]espite its irrelevance to individual merit," sexual orien-
tation discrimination exists "in all walks of life, ranging from
employment to education." 4 ' Moreover, "social prejudice
sometimes takes the form of unprovoked attacks on those
perceived to be gay." 4 9 The court noted that, in addition to
144. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439-42 (1985).
145. Gay Rights Coalition, 536 A.2d I (D.C. 1987).
146. Id. at 31-39.
147. Id. at 37.
148. Id. at 35. See also Developments, supra note 142, at 1554-57, 1575. Gay and
lesbian students may be particularly alienated from their peers. Id. at 1602 n.125,
citing A. Bell, M. Weinberg & S. Hammersmith, SEXUAL PREFERENCES, 95, 163
(1981).
149. Gay Rights Coalition, 536 A.2d at 36. See also Developments, supra note 142,
at 1541-42. An annual survey by the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force "docu-
mented 7,031 hate-motivated incidents against gays in 1989, ranging from harass-
ment to homicide." Hlerscher, S.F. Again Tops U.S. in Repoils of Gay Bashing San
Francisco Chronicle, June 7, 1990, at A4, col. 4. In 1990, the total number of re-
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the District, legislative or executive protection against sexual
orientation discrimination had been adopted in other states,
cities and counties. 50
In the one case which addresses a university hate speech
policy, Doe v. University of Michigan,' the court noted the ab-
sence of "federal statutory or constitutional provisions against
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or Vietnam
Veteran's status," but that "does not mean that the University
may not adopt regulations more protective than existing
law .... ,152 Like the University of Michigan, the hate
speech policies proposed or promulgated by other institutions
are not limited to those groups which have been granted spe-
cial status under the equal protection clause. Individuals pro-
tected belong to classes defined by sex, race, color, religion,
ethnicity, national origin, ancestry, alienage, age, marital status,
handicap, disability, creed, as well as sexual orientation and
Vietnam veteran status.
5
ported anti-gay incidents in a half-dozen major U.S. cities increased 42 percent.
Fernandez, Antigay Attacks Suging in S.F., San Francisco Examiner, March 6, 1991,
at Al, col. 5. Bias-crime statutes in a number of stares and the District of Colun-
bia expressly include crimes motivated by the sexual orientation of tite victim.
D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-4001 (1981 & Stipp. 1990); IL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§
110-15 (1980 & Supp. 1990); MINN. STAT. § 609.2231 Suhd. 4 (1987 & Supp.
1990); NEV. REV. STAT. § 207.185 (1989). For a description of student discrimina-
tory harassment based upon "sexual preference", see Note, Student Discliminatoy
Harassment, 16 J. OF C. & UNIV. L. 311, 313 (1989).
150. Gay Rights Coalition, 536 A.2d at 33 n.24. See also Developments, supra note
142, 1667-68; Meeker, Dombrink & Geis, State Law and Local Ordinances in Calfor-
nia Bar ing Discimination on the Basis of Sexual Orientation, 10 U. DAYrON L. REV.
745 (1985); Case, Repealable Rights: Municipal Civil Rights Protection for Lesbians and
Gays, 7 LAW & INEQUALITY 441 (1989).
151. Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
152. Id. at 861 n.l. See Note, supra note 108, at 693 n.74, contending that
the "communitarian" justification for group libel laws would support inclusion of
.sexual preference;" and Smolla, supra note 2, at 171 n.I, assuming, with respect
to inclusion of "sexual preference," that the "constitutional analysis would not be
altered appreciably as the nature of the victimization changes."
153. See, e.g., ACLU-NC Policy Concerning Racist and Other Group-Based
Harassment on College Campuses ("ACLU-NC Policy", Appendix A); University of
California/Office of the President, Universitywide Student Conduct: Harassment
Policy ("U.C. Policy", Appendix B); Stanford University, Interpretation of Funda-
mental Standard ("Stanford Policy," Appendix C);-University of Michigan Policy on
Discrimination and Discriminatory Harassment ("University of Michigan Policy,"
Appendix D); University of Wisconsin (see Hodulik, Prohibiting Disoirinatoly
Harassment by Regulating Student Speech, 16 J. OF C. & UNIV. L. 573, 585 (1990)).
Of these, only the U.C. Policy is non-exclusive in its listing of protected catego-
ries. For a general criticism of tihe ACLU-NC Policy by a self-professed
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3. Emotional Distress
A broad hate speech policy will attempt to protect those
targeted from the harmful mental and emotional effects of the
speech in and of itself. Hate speech produces in the target a
range of mental and emotional distress, including feelings of
guilt, shame, anxiety, fear, vulnerability, inferiority, inadequacy,
and personal degradation. 154 The state has a strong interest
in compensating the individual for serious emotional dis-
tress. 5 5 Common law and statutory bases exist which provide
a foundation for imposing liability for the infliction of emo-
tional distress. This authority has been used to redress hate
speech. 1
56
Taking Chaplinsky at face value, words which in and of
"card-carrying member," see Robde, Crafting Campus Speech Codes/Any Limitations
Are Bound to Violate the 1st Amendment, San Francisco Daily Journal, July 19, 1990,
at 4, col. 5. The national board of the ACLU seems to take a different view from
its California affiliates. Hentoff, Saving the ACLU from Dvrowning, San Francisco
Daily Journal, Nov. 19, 1990, at 4, col. 3. A Policy Statement adopted by the
ACLU National Board of Directors on October 13, 1990 appears in Strossen,
supra note 133, at 571-73. The ACLU's General Counsel has expressed the opin-
ion that the ACLU-NC Policy "might pass constitutional muster as a facial matter."
Id. at 520-21 n.177. But she believes that the Stanford Policy and that adopted by
the University of Wisconsin are unconstitutional. Id. at 497 n.61, 524-30. Professor
Lawrence appears to believe that the Stanford Policy is constitutional. Lawrence,
supra note 133, at 450.
154. Emotional distress may be manifested in physiological symptoms, and have
long-term psychological and behavioral effects. Matsuda, supra note 1, at 2336-38;
Delgado, supra note 2, at 13549; Kretzmer, supra note 22, at 466.
155. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text. In addition to defamation,
damages for mental and emotional distress are awarded to remedy invasion of the
interest in dignity in numerous actions at common law, incluling assault and
invasion of privacy. Delgado, supra note 2, at 144 n.57; Amdursky, The Interest In
Mental Tranquility, 13 BUFF. L. REV. 339 (1963).
156. See, e.g., Agarwal v. Johnson, 25 Cal. 3d 932, 946, 603 P.2d 58, 66, 160
Cal. Rptr. 141, 149 (1979) ("A prima facie case requires: '(1) outrageous conduct
by the defendant, (2) intention to cause or reckless disregard of the probability of
causing emotional distress, (3) severe emotional suffering and (4) actual and
proximate causation of the emotional distress . . . "); Delgado, supra note 2,
reviewing cases, at 150-65, and arguing that "an independent tort action for racial
insults is both permissible and necessary," at 134; Love, Discriminatoly Speech and
the Toil of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 123
(1990), reviewing cases and arguing that Section 46, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS, with modifications should be the basis for "vindicating the rights of the
victims of discriminatory speech". But "[tiraditional civil libertarians caution that
the intentional infliction of emotional distress theory should almost never apply to
verbal harassment." Strossen, supra note 133, at 515.
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themselves cause serious emotional distress "by their very ut-
terance cause injury." 157 Like defamatory false statements,
words which in and of themselves cause serious emotional dis-
tress can be considered forms of non-speech, which may be
proscribed without any cause for first amendment con-
cern. '5 Even though defamatory false statements have, since
Chaplinsky, been given some measure of protection in order to
avoid inhibiting true speech, they may, with appropriate safe-
guards, be proscribed by civil liability.'59 Similarly, to the ex-
tent that words which injure per se may, on occasion, be
deemed to have the characteristic of true speech, in other
words, some minimal communicative content,160 certain ap-
propriate safeguards allow their proscription.
In order to proscribe speech solely for its per se harmful
effect on an individual, it is not necessary to abandon first
amendment precedent and adopt a "non-neutral, value-laden
approach."16' Hate speech, like violence and falsity, distorts
the marketplace of ideas, and may be prohibited, not despite
the values of the first amendment, but because of them.
Certain hate speech policies describe the prohibited
speech by using the characterization "fighting words," and
quoting or paraphrasing the Chaplinsky formulation, even
though neither breach of the peace, nor the emotional reac-
tion per se of the target, is the apparent focus of the policy.
"Fighting words" are defined in the policies by reference to
class based animus, 162 and their use is proscribed by refer-
ence to intimidation and harassment.
63
157. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). See supra notes 12-14
and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text; see supra notes 109-11 and
accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 27-34 and accompanying text.
160. The court in Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1203, suggested that if Nazi
symbols were deemed to assert Nazi ideology, they were to be treated as constiti-
tionally protected opinion, and not mere false fact.
161. Matsuda, supra note 1, at 2357.
162. The U.C. Policy, Appendix B, defines "fighting words" as including "those
terms widely recognized to be derogatory references" to specified class character-
istics "and other personal characteristics." The Stanford Policy, Appendix C,
defines "fighting words" in part as those "commonly understood to convey direct
and visceral hatred or contempt for human beings based upon" membership in a
protected class. The "fighting words" doctrine provided key elements to the
University of Wisconsin policy, but the policy does not use the phrase. Hodulik,
supra note 153, at 583.
163. Under the U.C. Policy, Appendix B, "fighting words" are prohibited when
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Other policies make no use of the term "fighting words"
or the Chaplinsky formulation. These policies define the pro-
hibited speech directly by reference to class based animus"6 4
and likewise, describe the proscribed effects as intimidation
and/or harassment.'65
The use of "fighting words" as the centerpiece of a hate
speech policy clearly signals an institution's intent to limit the
scope of the policy to the boundaries of regulation under the
first amendment. Reformulating the "fighting words" concept
to specifically reference the protected classes would presum-
ably ensure that the purpose of the policy is understood. How-
ever, such an approach is problematic and ultimately unsatis-
factory. It carries with it the deficiencies of the "fighting
words" concept as an operative first amendment principle in
this context. 66 It at least raises a question as to whether
some tendency to violent action or reaction must be demon-
strated for application of the policy. And, even when qualified
by reference to participation in institutional programs and
activities, it may fail to sufficiently reflect the goals and values
of the institution.
B. Causal Relationship/Speech and Effects
The policy should articulate a causal relationship between
they constitute "harassment," which in turn is defined as creating a "hostile and
intimidating environment which ... will interfere with the victim's ability to
pursue his or her education or otherwise to participate fully in University pro-
grams and activities." The Stanford Policy, Appendix C, speaks variously of "ha-
rassment by personal vilification," "discriminatory harassment," and "discriminatory
intimidation by threats of violence." Persuasive arguments support the proposition
that intimidation which is coercive or manipulative is outside the scope of the
first amendment. CREENAWALT, supra note 14, at 249-59; Comment, Coercion, Black-
mai4 And the Limits of Protected Speech, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1469 (1983).
164. The ACLU-NC Policy, Appendix A, would prohibit speech which "is
specifically intended to and does harass . . . on the basis of" membership in a
protected group. The University of Michigan policy, Appendix D, proscribed
speech "that stigmatizes or victimizes ...on the basis of" a class characteristic.
165. The ACLU-NC Policy, Appendix A, speaks of a "hostile and intimidating
environment which . . . will seriously and directly impede . . . educational oppor-
tunities." The University of Michigan policy, Appendix D, also spoke of "an intimi-
dating, hostile or demeaning environment," "academic efforts," "educational pur-
suits" and "participation in University sponsored extra-curricular activities."
166. See supra notes 127-30 and accompanying text. See also Koepke, The
University of California Hate Speech Policy: A Good Heat in IlU-Fitting Garb, 12 COMM-
ENT 599, 610-14 (1990).
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the proscribed speech and the effect(s) which an institution
deems harmful or undesirable. Where the "fighting words" for-
mulation appears in the policy, the causal relationship will be
incorporated.'67 Otherwise, the policy will either require that
the effect has occurred or that there is some specified degree
of likelihood that the effect will occur.
68
In addition to articulating a causal relationship, the policy
must reflect circumstances that will ensure that the relation-
ship will exist in the individual case.6 9 The location in which
hate speech occurs is clearly related to the likelihood of pro-
ducing an intimidating effect or emotional distress, as well as
affecting the balance of first amendment and other institution-
al interests. 70 The policy, therefore, may express greater
concern with speech which occurs in a dormitory or classroom,
or where there otherwise is a "captive audience," than with
speech which occurs at scheduled rallies and public addresses,
the subject of which have been previously advertised. 7
167. The U.C. Policy, Appendix B, modifies the formulation, and, therefore,
the causal relationship ("inherently likely to provoke a violent reaction whether or
not they actually do so"). Stanford Policy, Appendix C ("which by their very
utterance inflict injury or tend to incite to an immediate breach of the peace").
168. Compare ACLU-NC Policy, Appendix A ("does harass" and "creates a
hostile and intimidaling environment which . . . will seriously and directly im-
pede") with University of Michigan Policy, Appendix D ("has the . . . reasonably
foreseeable effect of interfering"). Note that both the ACLU-NC Policy and the
University of Michigan Policy, as well as the U.C. Policy, seem to articulate differ-
ent causal relationships at different points in the policy. Such differences, if princi-
pled, should be clearly articulated and explained, so as to avoid uncertainty in
interpretation and application.
169. A strict requirement of proof of causal connection may substantially
hinder the effectiveness of the policy. See discussion of experience under British
statute in Kretzmer, supra note 22, at 506. However, the causation element itself
has first amendment significance. Shauer, Mrs. Patsgraff and the Fist Amendment, 47
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 161 (1090).
170. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. The U.C. Policy, Appendix B,
applies "on University property, or other property to which these policies apply as
defined in campus implementing regulations, or in connection with official Univer-
sity finctions or University sponsored programs." Such a policy would be less
subject to first amendment challenge than one which applies to students or other
institutional personnel at all times and places.
171. See, e.g., University of Mich. Policy, Appendix D. Students in a college
classroom were found to constitute a "captive audience" by a court considering
whether the professor's use of profanity could be disciplined. Martin v. Parrish,
805 F.2d 583, 586 (51h Cir. 1986). A "captive audience" might be found in an
otherwise public place. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304
(plurality opinion), 307-8 (concurring opinion) (1974) (public transit system). It has
been argued that, consistent with the first amendment, one may be protected
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Similarly, a requirement that the speech be face to face or
directed at a certain individual or a small group of individuals
would provide some assurance that the only speech which will
be prohibited is that which has the requisite causal relationship
with the undesirable effect(s).17' Anonymity of the speaker
would presumably not preclude a finding that the speech has
been sufficiently targeted. On the other hand, a targeting re-
quirement would preclude a prohibition on speech which has
no effect other than lending to the areation of a 'hostile environment""r
from extreme and outrageous language in the home and workplace, as well as
"other areas where the recipient found it necessary to be, such a food and cloth-
ing stores, and possibly restaurants." Note, supra note 66, at 1769-72. See also
Koepke, supra note 166, at 616-18.
172. See ACLU-NC Policy, Appendix A ("harass an individual or specific indi-
viduals" and "addressed directly to the individual or individuals whom it harass-
es"); and Stanford Policy, Appendix C ("insult or stigmatize an individual or a
small number of individuals" and "addressed directly to the individual or indi-
viduals whom it insults or stigmatizes"). Professor Matsuda argues that "[t]he lack
of individual targeting does not guarantee a lack of individual harm." Matsuda,
supra note 2, at 2372 n.256. The targeting requirement also runs the risk of
ignoring the harmful effects of hate speech against non-target group members who
associate with target groups. Id. at 2338 n.91. And Professor Smolla cautions
against "adopting a per se rule prohibiting penalties for racist and sexist speech
aimed at groups." Smolla, supra note 2, at 204-05. However, targeting may be
constitutionally required. See Rabinowitz, supra note 14, at 266; Note, supra note
66, at 1773 n.128; Hodulik, supra note 153, at 584. Even if targeting is not consti-
tutionally required, the direct and immediate harm which can be caused by target-
ed racial vilification distinguishes it from "general group libel and racial slurs" for
first amendment purposes. Downs, supra note 64, at 664-65. See also Frisby v.
Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 486 (1988) ("The type of picketers banned by the ...or-
dinance generally do not seek to disseminate a message to the general public, but
to intrude upon the targeted resident, and to do so in an especially offensive
way.").
173. The University of Michigan Policy, Appendix D, may have prohibited
speech which had only the effect of creating a "hostile environment." The Univer-
sity of Wisconsin policy is based upon "hostile environment." Hodulik, supra note
153, at 577-78, 582. The Wisconsin policy has also been challenged as violative of
the first amendment. Id. at 573. For an argument that a campus hate speech
policy based upon existing "hostile environment" harassment jurisprudence can
withstand first amendment scrutiny, and proposing "model language," see Note,
The Call for Campus Conduct Policies: Censotship or Constitutionality Permissible Limita-
tions on Speech, 75 MINN. L. REV. 201, 205, 220-31 (1990). Professor Karst states
that the UC Policy, see Appendix B, "seems less vulnerable' to constitutional at-
tack" than the University of Michigan policy, noting that the UC policy "bears a
strong analogy to the definition of racial harassment in employment that courts
have developed in interpreting both state and federal civil rights laws." Karst,
Boundaries and Reasons: Freedom of Expression and the Subordination of Groups, 1990
U. ILL. L. REV. 95, 135 n.162. For a discussion of the application of the first
amendment (and, specifically, the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines) to the pro.
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In determining the likelihood that the undesirable effect(s)
will occur, the policy should provide for an application of an
objective standard. For example, the prohibited speech has
been defined as that which is "commonly understood to con-
vey direct and visceral hatred or contempt," 7 4 and as includ-
ing words which are "widely recognized to be derogatory."
75
However, if the purpose of the standard is to determine the
likelihood of effect on a targeted individual, rather than to
establish a fault or state of mind requirement applied to the
speaker,176 then the standard should look to what can rea-
sonably be expected to be a reaction in members of the target-
ed group rather than the society at large.
77 Moreover, the
preferable focus would be on that reaction as related to the
undesirable effect, rather than as a description of the prohibit-
ed speech.
C. First Amendment Safeguards
The state of mind of the speaker, rather than a targeted
individual, can effectively serve as a basis for an additional
safeguard that the policy will not unduly interfere with first
amendment values. The addition of a state-of-mind or fault ele-
ment to the policy reflects first amendment jurisprudence in
both the incitement 17 and defamation 179 areas. The policy
may require intent on the part of the speaker,'
80 or merely
hibition of sexual or racial harassment in the workplace, see Balkin, Some Realism
About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the Fitst Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375,
421-28.
174. Stanford Policy, Appendix C.
175. U.C. Policy, Appendix B.
176. See infra notes 178-84 and accompanying text.
177. The reaction of target group members to hate speech is different from
the reaction of non-target group members. Matsuda, supra note 2, at 169-70. In
the tort action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff's height-
ened susceptibility will not preclude recovery when the defendant is aware of it.
Id. at 170 n.220. In the "fighting words" context, the focus is on "an average ad-
dressee." Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942). "[A] female
plaintiff states a prima facie case of hostile environment sexual harassment when
she alleges conduct which a reasonable woman would consider sufficiently severe
or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working
environment." Ellison v. Brady, 91 Daily Journal D.A.R. 1547, 1550 (9th Cir.
1991).
178. See supra note 17-18 and accomanying text.
179. See supra text accompanying notes 27-31 and notes 37-40.
180. ACLU-NC Policy, Appendix A ("specifically intended to . . . harass an in-
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fault through negligence.' 8' However, if the undesirable ef-
fects addressed by the policy include the emotional distress per
se of a targeted individual, only an intent requirement would
be clearly consistent with both general civil law' and first
amendment precedent. 8s
An additional first amendment safeguard would be found
in the creation of a catalogue containing the type of speech
which, in the first instance, would be deemed to involve a like-
lihood that the undesirable effect(s) will occur."8 4 Such a cat-
alogue would provide clear notice as to particular words which
would call the policy into play, and would provide some con-
dividual"); and Stanford Policy, Appendix C ("intended to insult or stigmatize").
See also Delgado, supra note 2, at 145, arguing that most people know that certain
words are only calculated to wound, and that there is no other use for them;
therefore, "[t]he intentionality of racial insults is obvious." An intent requirement
for conviction tinder a British hate speech statute "made it almost impossible to
convict purveyors of racist speech." Kretzmer, supra note 22, at 501.
181. ACLU-NC Policy, Appendix A ("reasonably knows or should know
will . . . impede"); U.C. Policy, Appendix B ("as a matter of common knowledge,
inherently likely to provoke a violent reaction;" and "which the student uttering
them should reasonably know will interfere"); University of Michigan Policy, Ap-
pendix D ("purpose or reasonably foreseeable effect of interfering").
182. Civil liability for the infliction of emotional distress per se requires intent
or recklessness. See supra note 156.
183. In the defamation context, the speaker must have "in fact entertained se-
rious doubts" as to the truth of the publication. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S.
727 (1968). Professor Le Bel argues that "a fault element focusing only on the
state of mind of the defendant with regard to causing harm to the plaintiff
provides an insufficient shield for speech that should receive constitutional protec-
tion." Le Bel, supra note 120, at 334. However, Edward M. Chen, ACLU-NC Staff
Counsel, contends that: "Requiring intent ... eliminates vagueness and over-
breadth . . . [P]urposeful intent to discriminate implicates maximum equal protec-
tion interests." Koepke, The University of California late Speech Policy: A Good Heart
in Ill-Fitting Garb, 12 Comment 593, 598 (1990) (Chen, Preface). See also Frisby v.
Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 498 (1988) (Stevens J., dissenting) ("I do not believe that
picketing for the sole purpose of imposing psychological harm on a family in the
shelter of their home is constitutionally protected.").
184. The ACLU-NC Policy, Appendix A, suggests "specific illustrations of ex-
pected occurrences which demonstrate when the policy does or does not apply."
When proposed, the Stanford Policy, Appendix C, was accompanied by comments
which listed the kinds of expression covered "not exhaustively, and with apologies
for the affront involved even in listing them" as including "'nigger', 'kike', 'faggot',
and 'cunt'; symbols such as K.K.K. regalia directed at African-American students,
or Nazi swastikas directed a Jewish students." Listing specific terms would help
emphasize the focus and justification for the policy. "There is a qualitative dif-
ference historically, socially, and psychologically between being called an 'asshole'
and a 'nigger.' The latter is not only offensive, it is oppressive." Koepke, supra
note 183, at 596 (Chen, Preface).
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trol over the discretion of the fact finder in a process of apply-
ing the policy to individual cases. The catalogue may be in
addition to, or in lieu of, more generic descriptions of the type
of speech considered likely to produce the undesirable ef-
fect(s).
Additional safeguards may be procedural 8 5 rather than
substantive, and include an exacting standard of proof,
186 as
well as public proceedings at the option of the respondent.
Open proceedings would also serve the primarily educational,
rather than punitive, goals of the policy, and help build con-
sensus in the community on the interpretation and application
of the policy. The consequences of a violation, particularly a
first violation, should also reflect the educational purposes.
Community service, perhaps with a class based campus student
organization, might be the preferred sanction.'
8 7
As a matter of policy, the interests of the individuals and
groups in need of protection of a hate speech policy, and the
values which inhere in the first amendment, are overlapping
and are, to that extent, consistent. The first amendment is a
necessary tool for those who are not in positions of govern-
mental or institutional control; disruptive speech is considered
by some such outsiders as a legitimate form of political and
social protest.'8 Indeed, some members of the protected
groups may consider a hate speech policy to be, at best, pa-
tronizing and paternalistic, and, at worst, a contributor to an
institutionalization of class based victimization and stigma.
185. The ACIU-NC Policy, Appendix A, requires that it be enforced "in a
manner consistent with due process protections . . . proportionate to the gravity
of the violation."
186. In the defamation context, proof must be "clear and convincing," at least
when the plaintiff is a public official or public figure. Supra note 27 and accompa-
nying text.
187. The nature of the sanctions also affects the first amendment consequenc-
es. It has been argued that "more severe harms are required to justify criminal
punishment than to warrant civil liability;" and that "a degree of vagueness and
open-endedness [is permitted] in a standard for civil recovery" than would be
acceptable in a criminal provision. GREENAWALT, supra note 14, at 293, 319-21. See
also Koepke, supra note 166, at 619, concerning due process and proportionate
punishment.
188. See, e.g., Note, "Offensive Speech" and the First Amendment, 53 B.U.L. REV.
834, 854 (1973), concerning use of offensive words by the Black Panthers. But
Professor Lawrence states that "[iut is difficult for us to helieve that we should
fight to protect speech rights for racists because that will ensure our own speech
rights." Lawrence, supra note 133, at 466-67.
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Moreover, speech which might be covered by the policy (at
least when not anonymous) allows for the self-identification of
bigots, and might provide a safety valve for otherwise more
harmful emotions.
189
On the other hand, a hate speech policy could itself be a
safeguard for first amendment values. In the absence of a
clearly articulated, specific, and carefully designed policy, the
interpretation and application of broad codes of conduct will
be inherently arbitrary, and potentially more inhibiting of ex-
pression. Standards such as "respect for ... the rights of oth-
ers as is demanded of good citizens," 9' when applied to
speech or expressive conduct, invite the repression of unpopu-
lar ideas. 9'
III. PROPOSED HATE SPEECH POLICY
A. Statement of Policy
A student.9 2 who intentionally or recklessly uses hate
speech, under such circumstances that another student is likely
to suffer serious emotional distress or be intimidated from full
participation in any university activity or program, shall be
disciplined. A student shall not be disciplined under this Policy
for any conduct which s/he demonstrates has serious literary,
artistic, political or scientific value.
189. But see Delgado, supra note 2, at 140 and sources cited n.39 ("There is
little evidence that racial slurs serve as a 'safety valve' for anxiety which would
otherwise be expressed in violence."); and Kretzmer, supra note 22, at 487 (There
is "no evidence" to support the "general conclusion that suppression of speech
inevitably leads to violence.").
190. Stanford Policy, Appendix C.
191. More generally, restriction of hate speech appears consistent with certain
of the important values which have been identified as lying at the foundation of
the first amendment. See Delgado, supra note 2, at 175-79. "Speech that preempts
further speech rather than inviting response [i.e., hate speech] does not serve the
purposes of the first amendment and is therefore less deserving of protection."
Lawrence, supra note 133, at 454 n.92.
192. This policy does not address the circumstances tinder which the institu-
tion might discipline faculty members or staff. "[T]he State has interests as an
employer in regulating the speech of its employees that differ significantly from
those it possesses in connection with the regulation of the speech of the citizenry
in general." Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). However,
where speech by a student may be disciplined under the proposed policy, it could
almost certainly be disciplined in the case of a faculty or staff member.
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B. Definition/Principles of Interpretation and Application
1. "Hate speech" is any word, gesture, graphic representa-
tion, or symbol which reflects hatred, contempt, or stigmatiza-
tion by reason of race, ethnicity, national origin, gender, reli-
gion, handicap or sexual orientation.
2. The following are presumed to constitute "hate speech":
["nigger," "kike," "cunt," "faggot," "wop," "spic," "gook,"
K.K.K. regalia].'9 However, a student shall be permitted to
demonstrate that, under the particular facts and circumstances,
characterization as hate speech is inappropriate.
3. A student acts intentionally when s/he desires a particular
effect to occur or knows that the effect is certain, or substan-
tially certain, to occur. A student acts recklessly when s/he
deliberately disregards a high degree of probability that a par-
ticular effect will occur. 4
4. Hate speech which is comprised of, includes, or is part of
a threat of physical harm to person or property, or a specific
discriminatory act, shall be presumed to be used intentionally
or recklessly. However, a student shall be permitted to dem-
onstrate that, under the particular facts and circumstances, the
requisite state of mind was not present.
5. Hate speech which has a strong tendency to result in phys-
ical harm to person or property, or in a specific discriminatory
act, shall be presumed to be likely to cause serious emotional
distress or intimidation. However, a student shall be permitted
to demonstrate that, under the particular facts and circum-
stances, a requisite effect was not likely to occur.
6. In determining whether hate speech is likely to cause seri-
ous emotional distress or intimidation, the applicable standard
193. There are divergent views on whether a member of a minority or histori-
cally subjugated group should be subject to sanction for hate speech directed at a
member of a majority or historically dominant group. See Matsuda, supra note 2,
at 2361-63; Kretzmer, supra note 22, at 511; GREENAWALT, supra note 14, at 147
("'Honkey' hurts a lot less than 'nigger' and 'WASP' hurts a lot less than 'kike'.");
Koepke, supra note 166, at 618-19. It is this author's view that the circumstances
of the case should govern, and that such circumstances may properly result in the
sanctioning of a minority student. This approach may be necessary to avoid
unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination. Strossen, supra note 133, at 506-07.
194. These formulations are based on those found in RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 46, comment (i) (1965) concerning the intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress.
[Vol. 31
REGULATION OF HATE SPEECH
shall be the likely effect on a student of ordinary sensibilities
who shares the class-defining characteristic.
7. This Policy applies on all university property, and during
all university activities and programs whether or not conducted
on university property.' 5
8. In determining whether any element of an offense under
the Policy is established, the following additional factors are
particularly relevant:
(a) Whether or not the student's conduct is directed to a
specific individual, a small number of specific individuals, or a
large number of specific individuals.
(b) Whether or not the student's conduct is part of a pat-
tern of vilification, harassment, intimidation, or discrimina-
tion.' 6
(c) Whether or not the student's conduct occurs during
classroom instruction, or in a dormitory, library, laboratory or
other research center. 97
9. In determining whether conduct has serious literary, artis-
tic, political or scientific value, the applicable standard shall be
the reasonable member of the university community.
The legal and policy rationales for the various elements of
the proposed policy should be clear from the previous discus-
sion.' 9 However, certain aspects of the proposal warrant
195. The institution's interests extend beyond the borders of the campus to
the arena of any school sponsored activity. Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlemeir,
484 U.S. 260 (1088). See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text; Cyory, supra
note 104, at 252.
196. The Model Communicative Tonts Act, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1, 36 (1990),
would require a "pattern of communication evincing a continuity of purpose."
Current tort law does not require proof of a pattern of communication in cases
of racial or ethnic harassment, but there is such a requirement for verbal sexual harass-
ment. Love, supra note 154, at 131, 135. In the "hostile workplace environment"
context, "the required showing of severity or seriousness of the harassing conduct
varies inversely with the pervasiveness or frequency of the conduct." Ellison v.
Brady, 91 Daily Journal D.A.R. 1547, 1549 (9th Cir. 1991). See also Note, supra
note 173, at 235, arguing that a single act may validly be sanctioned under a
university hate speech policy.
197. Even as to university facilities which might properly be characterized as a
"public forum," "content-based exclusions" may be justified by a compelling state
interest when the exclusion is "narrowly drawn to achieve that end." Widmar v.
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269-70 (1981).
198. For other formulations of the circumstances under which "hate speech"
may constitutionally be protected, see The Model Communicative Topis Act, supra
note 196; Smolla, supra note 2, at 210-11;" Rabinowitz, supra note 14, at 279;
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more focused consideration. The value formulation which ap-
pears, in the nature of a defense, as part of the Statement of
Policy is taken from the Court's definitional approach to ob-
scenity,199 one of the categories of unprotected speech. It is
considered to be more workable than distinctions based upon
ideas or opinion, and more suitable to the focus of the policy
and the educational setting. Similarly, the reasonable person
standard, also applicable in the obscenity context,200 is modi-
fied in the proposed policy to reflect the educational setting.
The inclusion of the value formulation should serve as a
sufficient fail safe mechanism for first amendment purposes.
However, even in the nature of a defense, this additional ele-
ment creates a risk that the policy will prove less effective in
application. In part for this reason, the proposed policy es-
chews the "taken as a whole" element of the obscenity formula-
tion.20' Moreover, the value judgment should be made with-
out reference to the speaker's interest in the emotive quality of
the speech.2
The proposed policy is appropriate for secondary schools
and higher level educational institutions. Although recognizing
the concerns which led Professor Smolla to draw a distinction
for these purposes,2 03 this author believes that, whatever cau-
tion the first amendment might counsel in treating these insti-
tutions in a similar manner,20 4 the proposed policy is suffi-
Downs, supra note 64, at 684; Koepke, supra note 166, at 621. See also as to
emotional distress generally, Le Bel, supra note 120, at 351. Descriptions of uni-
versity hate speech policies which have been adopted by some public and private
institutions can be found in Note, supra note 173, at 208-09, and Comment,
Closing the Campus Gates to Free Expression: The Regulation of Offensive Speech at
Colleges and Universities, 39 EMORY L.J. 1351, 1375-77 n.13
7
, 1379-80 (1990). The
applicability of federal and state constitutional provisions to private university hate
speech policies is considered in Comment, supn, at 1382-87, 1394-98.
199. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23-24 (1973).
200. Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 500-01 (1987).
201. A persuasive argument can be made that, once hate speech is determined
to be unprotected, the fact that it may be "alongside good speech" should not
provide any first amendment immunity. Downs, supra note 64, at 658.
202. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
203. Professor Smolla would restrict "racist attacks on groups" at secondary
schools wherever on school grounds they might occur. At colleges, restrictions
would be limited to "classroom instruction, or in other settings directly involving
the university's institutional mission but not in university setttings that are part of
the 'general marketplace' of university discourse." Smolla, supra note 2, at 23-24
(emphasis in original). See also Strossen, supra note 133, at 503-05.
204. See text accompanying note 126 and discussion thereafter and notes 23-24,
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ciently protective of first amendment interests that similar
treatment is justified.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is unlikely that a hate speech policy can be formulated
which is sensitive to the interests of free expression and
equality, yet fully satisfactory to committed spokespersons for
those interests. Neither those who maintain strong first amend-
ment positions nor civil rights activists can be truly comfort-
able with the accommodations necessarily made to the compet-
ing, if not conflicting, values. Indeed, there is a serious threat
that a hate speech policy will be formulated or implemented so
as to undermine both sets of values.
Such a result, however, is not inevitable. Hopefully, over
time, there will be fewer and fewer occasions for applying the
policy, a reflection of true progress toward a just society. How-
ever, if this is not possible, the area of uncertainty inherent in
any policy-the result, in part, of necessary flexibility-should
narrow as consensus develops regarding speech which truly
harms and has no value.
97, 104, 203 and accompanying text.
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APPENDIX A
ACLU-NC POLICY CONCERNING RACIST AND OTHER
GROUP-BASED HARRASSMENT ON COLLEGE CAMPUSES
Campus administrators are obligated to take all steps nec-
essary within constitutional bounds to minimize and eliminate
a hostile educational environment which impairs access of
protected minorities to equal educational opportunities. Cam-
pus administrators must: speak out vigorously against expres-
sions of hatred or contempt based on race, color, national or
ethnic origin, alienage, sex, religion, sexual orientation or dis-
ability; promote equality and mutual accommodation and un-
derstanding among these groups and the balance of the com-
munity (including steps to assure diversity within the faculty,
administration, staff, and student body and to incorporate into
the curriculum and extra-curricular activities educational ef-
forts to reduce racism and other forms of discrimination); and
eliminate discriminatory educational policies, practices and
procedures that exist on the campuses.
Campus administrators may not, however, enact campus
codes of conduct prohibiting discriminatory harassment of
students, faculty, administrators and staff on the basis of
speech or expression unless at a minimum all of the following
conditions are met:
1. The code of conduct reaches only speech or expression
that:
a) is specifically intended to and does harass an individual
or specific individuals on the basis of their sex, race, color,
disability, religion, sexual orientation, alienage, or national and
ethnic origin; and
b) is addressed directly to the individual or individuals
whom it harasses; and
c) creates a hostile and intimidating environment which
the speaker reasonably knows or should know will seriously
and dire
ctly impede the educational opportunities of the individual or
individuals to whom it is directly addressed; and
2. The code of conduct is enforced in a manner consis-
tent with due process protections (including the right of any
individual charged with violation to notice and a hearing),
contains specific illustrations of expected occurrences which
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demonstrate when the policy does or does not apply, is pro-
portionate to the gravity of the violation, and does not impose
prior restraint upon expression.
March 8, 1990
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APPENDIX B
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA/OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
UNIVERSrIYWIDE STUDENT CCONDUCT: HARASSMENT POLICY
Addition to Section 51.00, Student Conduct, Policies Apply-
ing to Campus Activities, Organizations, and Students (Part A)
51.00 Student Conduct
Chancellors may impose discipline for violation of Univer-
sity policies or campus regulations. Such violations include the
following types of misconduct:
51.xx The use of "fighting words" by students to harass any
person(s) on University property, on other property to which
these policies apply as defined in campus implementing regula-
tions, or in connection with official University functions or
University-sponsored programs.
"Fighting words" are those personally abusive epithets which,
when directly addressed to any ordinary person are, in the
context used and as a matter of common knowledge, inherent-
ly likely to provoke a violent reaction whether or not they actu-
ally do so. Such words include, but are not limited to, those
terms widely recognized to be derogatory references to race,
ethnicity, religion, sex, sexual orientation, disability, and other
personal characteristics. "fighting words" constitute "harass-
ment" when the circumstances of their utterance create a hos-
tile and intimidating environment which the student uttering
them should reasonably know will interfere with the victim's
ability to pursue effectively his or her education or otherwise
to participate fully in University programs and activities.
September 21, 1989
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APPENDIX C
STANFORD UNIVERSITY
INTERPRETATION OF FUNDAMENTAL STANDARD
Stanford University Campus Report, May 30, 1990, p. 17.
Preamble
The Fundamental Standard requires that students act with
"such respect for ... the rights of others as is demanded of
good citizens." Some incidents in recent years on campus have
revealed doubt and disagreement about what this requirement
means for students in the sensitive area where the right of free
expression can conflict with the right to be free of invidious
discrimination. This interpretation of the Fundamental Stan-
dard is offered by the Student Conduct Legislative Council to
provide students and administrators with guidance in this area.
Fundamental Standard Interpretation:
Free Expression and Discriminatory Harassment
1. Stanford is committed to the principles of free inquiry
and free expression. Students have the right to hold and vigor-
ously defend and promote their opinions, thus entering them
into the life of the University, there to flourish or wither ac-
cording to their merits. Respect for this right requires that
students tolerate even expression of opinions which they find
abhorrent. Intimidation of students by other students in their
exercise of this right, by violence or threat of violence, is there-
fore considered to be a violation of the Fundamental Standard.
2. Stanford is also committed to principles of equal oppor-
tunity and non-discrimination. Each student has the right of
equal access to a Stanford education, without discrimination
on the basis of sex, race, color, handicap, religion, sexual ori-
entation, or national and ethnic origin. Harassment of students
on the basis of any of these characteristics contributes to a
hostile environment that makes access to education for those
subjected to it less than equal. Such discriminatory harassment
is therefore considered to be a violation of the Fundamental
Standard.
3. This interpretation of the Fundamental Standard is
intended to clarify the point at which protected free expres-
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sion ends and prohibited discriminatory harassment begins.
Prohibited harassment includes discriminatory intimidation by
threats of violence, and also includes personal vilification of
students on the basis of their sex, race, color, handicap, reli-
gion, sexual orientation, or national and ethnic origin.
4. Speech or other expression constitutes harassment by
personal vilification if it:
a) is intended to insult or stigmatize an individual or
a small number of individuals on the basis of their sex, race,
color, handicap, religion, sexual orientation, or national and
ethnic origin; and
b) is addressed directly to the individual or individuals
whom it insults or stigmatizes; and
c) makes use of insulting or "fighting" words or
non-verbal symbols.
In the context of discriminatory harassment by per-
sonal vilification, insulting or "fighting" words or non-verbal
symbols are those "which by their very utterance inflict injury
or tend to incite to an immediate breach of the peace," and
which are commonly understood to convey direct and visceral
hatred or contempt for human beings on the basis of their sex,
race, color, handicap, religion, sexual orientation, or national
and ethnic origin.
Effective
July 11, 1990
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APPENDIX D
THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN POLICY ON DISCRIMINATION AND
DISCRIMINATORY HARASSMENT
Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852, 856-57
(E.D.Mich. 1989)
A. The Terms of the Policy
The Policy established a three-tiered system whereby the
degree of regulation was dependent on the location of the con-
duct at issue. The broadest range of speech and dialogue was
"tolerated" in variously described public parts of the campus.
Only an act of physical violence or destruction of property was
considered sanctionable in these settings. Publications spon-
sored by the University such as the Michigan Daily and the
Michigan Review were not subject to regulation. The conduct of
students living in University housing is primarily governed by
the standard provisions of individual leases, however the Policy
appeared to apply in this setting as well. The Policy by its
terms applied specifically to "[e]ducational and academic cen-
ters, such as classroom buildings, libraries, research laborato-
ries, recreation and study centers[.]" In these areas, persons
were subject to discipline for:
1. Any behavior, verbal or physical, that stigmatizes or
victimizes an individual on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion,
sex, sexual orientation, creed, national origin, ancestry, age,
marital status, handicap or Vietnam-era veteran status, and that
a. Involves an express or implied threat to an
individual's academic efforts, employment, participation in
University sponsored extracurricular activities or personal safe-
ty; or b. Has the purpose or reasonably foreseeable effect
of interfering with an individual's academic efforts, employ-
ment, participation in University sponsored extra-curricular
activities or personal safety; or
c. Creates an intimidating, hostile, or demeaning
environment for educational pursuits, employment or partici-
pation in University sponsored extracurricular activities.
2. Sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and verbal
or physical conduct that stigmatizes or victimizes an individual
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on the basis of sex or sexual orientation where such behavior:
a. Involves an express or implied threat to an
individual's academic efforts, employment, participation in
University sponsored extracurricular activities or personal safe-
ty; or
b. Has the purpose or reasonably foreseeable effect
of interfering with an individual's academic efforts, employ-
ment, participation in University sponsored extra-curricular
activities or personal safety; or
c. Creates an intimidating, hostile, or demeaning
environment for educational pursuits, employment or partici-
pation in University sponsored extracurricular activities.
On August 22, 1989, the University publicly an-
nounced ... that it was withdrawing section l(c) on the
grounds that "a need exists for further explanation and clarifi-
cation of [that section] of the policy." No reason was given why
the analogous provision in paragraph 2(c) was allowed to
stand.
The Policy by its terms recognizes that certain speech
which might be considered in violation may not be
sanctionable, stating: "The Office of the General Counsel will
rule on any claim that conduct which is the subject of a formal
hearing is constitutionally protected by the first amendment."
[Vol. 31392
